Venus - Unlist Market & Borrow Cap

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Audit

Part of CertiK’s series

CertiK reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus - Unlist Market & Borrow Cap) on 9 Apr 2024: 6 findings, 0 critical; 4 marked fixed, 2 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Venus Protocol’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings6

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium000
Low104
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

Note that any centralization risks present in the existing codebase before the PR's in scope of this audit were not considered. Only those added to the in-scope PRs are addressed. We recommend all users carefully review the centralization risks, much of which can be found in our previous audits, which can be found here: [https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus](https://skynet.certik.com/projects/venus). ### PR429 MarketFacet In the contract `MarketFacet` the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` of the `AccessControlManager` can grant addresses the privilege to call the function `unlistMarket()`. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` or accounts granted this privilege may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and unlist legitimate markets, only if they also have control over pausing all necessary action states and updating borrow caps, supply caps, and collateral factors to 0. ### PR349 Comptroller In the contract `Comptroller`, the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` of the `AccessControlManager` can grant addresses the privilege to call the function `unlistMarket()`. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` or accounts granted this privilege may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and unlist legitimate markets, only if they also have control over pausing all necessary action states and updating borrow caps, supply caps, and collateral factors to 0.

LowFile Allows Solidity Version That Is SusceptibleOpen

In solidity versions 0.8.13 and 0.8.14, there is an [optimizer bug](https://github.com/ethereum/solidity-blog/blob/499ab8abc19391be7b7b34f88953a067029a5b45/_posts/2022-06-15-inline-assembly-memory-side-effects-bug.md) where, if the use of a variable is in a separate `assembly` block from the block in which it was stored, the `mstore` operation is optimized out, leading to uninitialized memory. The code currently does not have such a pattern of execution, but it does use `mstore`s in `assembly` blocks, so it is a risk for future changes.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (4)

  • contracts/Comptroller/Diamond/facets/MarketFacet.sol
  • contracts/Comptroller/Diamond/facets/PolicyFacet.sol
  • contracts/Comptroller/Diamond/facets/SetterFacet.sol
  • contracts/Comptroller.sol

Part of Venus Protocol’s security record

Venus Protocol
Audits67 audits by 7 firmsLast audit Sep 2025, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 67 reports, 4 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
IncidentIncident 12 May 2022Source: De.Fi incident database.
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