Venus wstETH Oracle

QuantstampRepository at commit f638cef

Audit

Part of Quantstamp’s series

Quantstamp reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus wstETH Oracle) on 20 Feb 2024: 2 findings, 0 critical; all acknowledged, none fixed; 1 more marked mitigated.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings6

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixedMitigated
Critical0000
High0000
Medium0000
Low0201

The firm marks these findings Mitigated. They are not counted as open, acknowledged or fixed.

LowOracle Assumes a Fixed 1:1 Ratio Between stETH and ETHMitigated

The `WstETHOracle` contract returns the price of the `wstETH` token in USD, which is calculated as follows: <p style="text-align: center;">$$P_{WSTETH/USD} = P_{WSTETH/STETH} \times P_{WETH/USD}$$</p> where $$P_{WSTETH/STETH}$$ represents the amount of `stETH` equivalent to 1 `wstETH` token, and $$P_{WETH/USD}$$ represents the price of `WETH` in USD. The former is fetched from the on-chain `stETH` token contract and reflects the actual exchange rate between `wstETH` and `stETH` in the Lido protocol when querying the price. The latter is fetched and returned from the `ResilientOracle`. This pricing formula assumes a 1:1 ratio between `stETH` and `ETH`, i.e., `stETH` is pegged to `ETH`. Such a design raises the following security concerns: 1. The oracle is unable to reflect the market price of `stETH`. Suppose `stETH` depegs from `ETH`, which may be due to reasons such as a large amount of `ETH` being removed from the Curve `stETH/ETH` pool. The market price of `stETH` has dropped, while the protocol may overvalue `stETH` temporarily during the depeg event. Assuming the depeg does not recover in time (note that withdrawals from Lido are not confirmed instantly compared to deposits), positions with `wstETH` as collateral will have an advantage in terms of borrowing power during this period. 1. Suppose the depeg continues so that the spread between the exchange rate and the market price is larger than $$1 - LT$$ (where $$LT$$ represents the liquidation threshold). In that case, it will become profitable to deposit `stETH` as collateral to the protocol, borrow `ETH`, and sell it in the secondary market. The utilization rate of `ETH` may increase, leading to potential issues such as lacking liquidity for withdrawals. 1. In an extreme scenario where the depeg cannot be recovered, the protocol may accrue bad debts if underwater positions with `wstETH` as collateral cannot be liquidated in time.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

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Repository and files the report names (1)

  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/oracle/contracts/oracles/WstETHOracle.sol at commit f638cef

Part of Venus Protocol’s security record

Venus Protocol
Audits67 audits by 7 firmsLast audit Sep 2025, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 67 reports, 4 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
IncidentIncident 12 May 2022Source: De.Fi incident database.
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