SpaceM - Audit

CertiKCode version: not recorded (see the report)

CertiK reviewed SpaceM Token (SpaceM - Audit) on 20 Jan 2025: 19 findings, 0 critical; 10 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged, 7 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen SpaceM Token’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings19

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High022
Medium102
Low606
MediumUnguaranteed Principal WithdrawalOpen

The staked token and reward token are the same in the `Staking` contract. However, there is no guarantee that the `Staking` has sufficient rewards since the rewards need to be transferred into contracts manually. As a result, when users are trying to withdraw their principal and rewards from the contract, the contract is not guaranteed to have enough balance to pay the users. Since the owner can modify the `rewardPool` at any time, if the rewards in the contract are insufficient, the user's principal might be claimed as a reward by other users. ```solidity function setRewardPool(uint256 _rewardPool) external onlyOwner { rewardPool = _rewardPool; emit RewardPoolUpdated(_rewardPool); } ``` Additionally, in `SpacemNodes`, calling `buy()`,`claimRewards()`, `claimAllRewards()` or `dailyDistribute()` will revert if there are insufficient rewards sent to the contract because of transfers to `stakingAddress` and `marketingAddress`. ```solidity if (lastDistributionDay < today) { // Calculate reward based on the number of tokens minted uint256 reward = (DAILY_TOKENS * collection.maxSupply()) / collection.minted(); dailyNodeReward[today] = reward; lastDistributionDay = today; // Update the last distribution day to today require(rewardsToken.transfer(stakingAddress, DAILY_STAKING), "Failed to transfer DAILY_STAKING"); require(rewardsToken.transfer(marketingAddress, DAILY_MARKETING), "Failed to transfer DAILY_MARKETING"); } ```

LowIncompatibility With Deflationary Tokens (Non-staOpen

The project design may not be compatible with non-standard ERC20 tokens, such as deflationary tokens or rebase tokens. The functions use `transferFrom()`/`transfer()` to move funds from the sender to the recipient but fail to verify if the received token amount matches the transferred amount. This could pose an issue with fee-on-transfer tokens, where the post-transfer balance might be less than anticipated, leading to balance inconsistencies. There might be subsequent checks for a second transfer, but an attacker might exploit leftover funds (such as those accidentally sent by another user) to gain unjustified credit.

LowIncorrect Use of PayableOpen

The `Staking` contract lacks a `receive()` function and any functions marked with the `payable` keyword, making it unable to accept native tokens. Consequently, the `transferFunds()` function is meaningless. In contrary, the `mint()` function in `Collection` contract have a payable function that does not utilize the forwarded ETH.

LowPotential Large Rewards GeneratedOpen

The daily reward is calculated based on the maximum supply of the `Spacem` token. If this value is set too high, the daily rewards could become excessively large, potentially exceeding the total supply of the `Spacem` token. ```solidity uint256 reward = (DAILY_TOKENS * collection.maxSupply()) / collection.minted(); ```

LowRewards Won't Be Distributed Unless Related FunctOpen

The `_dailyDistributeIfNeeded()` function is responsible for triggering the distribution of rewards. It is invoked within the `buy()`, `claimRewards()`, `claimAllRewards()`, and `dailyDistribute()` functions. However, if none of these functions are called on a given day, no rewards will be distributed for that day.

LowRisky Address in UseOpen

In the `SpacemNodes` contract, the `stakingAddress` is hardcoded as `0x62766990101d74f393F25e538191c00C40cB1fe4`, which poses security risks.

LowThird-Party DependenciesOpen

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with a third-party **Tether Token** which is an upgradeable contract. The scope of the audit treats third-party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised, and this may lead to lost or stolen assets.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Part of SpaceM Token’s security record

SpaceM Token
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jan 2025, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open SpaceM Token’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

1,045 projects reviewed · 1,376 reports · latest May 2025

See CertiK’s audits

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us