SpaceM Token audit reports

Avalanchespacem.world

SpaceM Token has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 20 Jan 2025; no critical findings reported.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm9

Statuses are the security firms’ own

9 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 1 medium, 6 low (7 open, 2 acknowledged).

High
2
Medium
1
Low
6
  • High Acknowledged

    Centralization Related Risks

    SpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025 · Report ↗

  • High Acknowledged

    Initial Token Distribution

    SpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Unguaranteed Principal Withdrawal

    SpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Incompatibility With Deflationary Tokens (Non-sta

    SpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Incorrect Use of Payable

    SpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Potential Large Rewards Generated

    SpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Rewards Won't Be Distributed Unless Related Funct

    SpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Risky Address in Use

    SpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Third-Party Dependencies

    SpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
SpaceM - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openFindings: 4 high · 3 medium · 12 low
10 fixed · 2 acknowledged · 7 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings19

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High022
Medium102
Low606
MediumUnguaranteed Principal WithdrawalSpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025Open

The staked token and reward token are the same in the `Staking` contract. However, there is no guarantee that the `Staking` has sufficient rewards since the rewards need to be transferred into contracts manually. As a result, when users are trying to withdraw their principal and rewards from the contract, the contract is not guaranteed to have enough balance to pay the users. Since the owner can modify the `rewardPool` at any time, if the rewards in the contract are insufficient, the user's principal might be claimed as a reward by other users. ```solidity function setRewardPool(uint256 _rewardPool) external onlyOwner { rewardPool = _rewardPool; emit RewardPoolUpdated(_rewardPool); } ``` Additionally, in `SpacemNodes`, calling `buy()`,`claimRewards()`, `claimAllRewards()` or `dailyDistribute()` will revert if there are insufficient rewards sent to the contract because of transfers to `stakingAddress` and `marketingAddress`. ```solidity if (lastDistributionDay < today) { // Calculate reward based on the number of tokens minted uint256 reward = (DAILY_TOKENS * collection.maxSupply()) / collection.minted(); dailyNodeReward[today] = reward; lastDistributionDay = today; // Update the last distribution day to today require(rewardsToken.transfer(stakingAddress, DAILY_STAKING), "Failed to transfer DAILY_STAKING"); require(rewardsToken.transfer(marketingAddress, DAILY_MARKETING), "Failed to transfer DAILY_MARKETING"); } ```

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LowIncompatibility With Deflationary Tokens (Non-staSpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025Open

The project design may not be compatible with non-standard ERC20 tokens, such as deflationary tokens or rebase tokens. The functions use `transferFrom()`/`transfer()` to move funds from the sender to the recipient but fail to verify if the received token amount matches the transferred amount. This could pose an issue with fee-on-transfer tokens, where the post-transfer balance might be less than anticipated, leading to balance inconsistencies. There might be subsequent checks for a second transfer, but an attacker might exploit leftover funds (such as those accidentally sent by another user) to gain unjustified credit.

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LowIncorrect Use of PayableSpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025Open

The `Staking` contract lacks a `receive()` function and any functions marked with the `payable` keyword, making it unable to accept native tokens. Consequently, the `transferFunds()` function is meaningless. In contrary, the `mint()` function in `Collection` contract have a payable function that does not utilize the forwarded ETH.

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LowPotential Large Rewards GeneratedSpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025Open

The daily reward is calculated based on the maximum supply of the `Spacem` token. If this value is set too high, the daily rewards could become excessively large, potentially exceeding the total supply of the `Spacem` token. ```solidity uint256 reward = (DAILY_TOKENS * collection.maxSupply()) / collection.minted(); ```

Open the report
LowRewards Won't Be Distributed Unless Related FunctSpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025Open

The `_dailyDistributeIfNeeded()` function is responsible for triggering the distribution of rewards. It is invoked within the `buy()`, `claimRewards()`, `claimAllRewards()`, and `dailyDistribute()` functions. However, if none of these functions are called on a given day, no rewards will be distributed for that day.

Open the report
LowRisky Address in UseSpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025Open

In the `SpacemNodes` contract, the `stakingAddress` is hardcoded as `0x62766990101d74f393F25e538191c00C40cB1fe4`, which poses security risks.

Open the report
LowThird-Party DependenciesSpaceM - Audit · CertiK · 20 Jan 2025Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with a third-party **Tether Token** which is an upgradeable contract. The scope of the audit treats third-party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised, and this may lead to lost or stolen assets.

Open the report

Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.

SpaceM Token: questions

Is SpaceM Token audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for SpaceM Token, dated 20 Jan 2025. The latest is by CertiK (“SpaceM - Audit”).

Who audited SpaceM Token?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for SpaceM Token.

Are there open findings in SpaceM Token’s audits?

9 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 1 medium, 6 low (7 open, 2 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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