Hinkal Protocol - 2

Quantstamp28 Aug 2026Code version: not recorded (see the report)

Quantstamp reviewed Hinkal (Hinkal Protocol - 2) on 28 Aug 2026: 14 findings, 0 critical; 9 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged, 2 open.

No open critical findings

Open the report Open Hinkal’s security record

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Findings14

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

Severity	Open	Acknowledged	Fixed
Critical	0	0	0
High	0	0	0
Medium	0	0	1
Low	2	3	8

LowArbitrary Emporium Calls Allow Theft of Untracked AssetsAcknowledged

`EmporiumUpgradeable.runAction()` executes the caller-supplied `stack.ops` as arbitrary calls from the Emporium contract. However, its balance checks only protect the caller-supplied `circomData.erc20TokenAddresses`. An attacker can submit a Min0 proof with no token rows and set `signerAddress` to `address(0)`, which requires no signature in `verifyWallet()`. The attacker can then use `stack.ops` to transfer residual ERC20 tokens or native ETH from Emporium. An empty token array prevents the resulting balance decrease from being checked. This allows anyone to steal assets accidentally transferred, donated, or stranded in Emporium. The attacker may also spend third-party assets through allowances previously granted by Emporium.

LowNative ETH Sent without Matching `address(0)` Token Slot Is LostAcknowledged

The accounting in `transact()` only properly includes `msg.value` into `balanceDif` upon encountering the `erc20TokenAddresses` set to `address(0)`. The circuit's pairwise uniqueness constraint ensures at most one `address(0)` slot. However, there is no checks for the case where the token set contains no native-ETH slot, but there are native tokens send along with the transaction. These would then be lost in the contract.

LowProblematic Zero HashesAcknowledged

`0` as a hash could be problematic and short-cut Merkle tree paths.