Quantstamp reviewed Telescope on 2 Nov 2026: 5 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged; 1 more marked mitigated.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed | Mitigated |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
`LiquidityVault.cancelVeNFTWithdrawal()` lets recipients recover their escrowed tAERO while paused, but anyone can still call `finalizeVeNFTWithdrawal()` through `Router`. A third party can finalize a funded request before the recipient cancels, forcing receipt of sAERO instead of allowing the recipient to keep tAERO or seek a liquid emergency exit.
Deposits are priced using the vault's accounted backing. AERO held by the `LiquidityVault` but not yet recognized through `accountCompoundedRewards()` is excluded, allowing a user to deposit at the lower pre-reward exchange rate. Once the rewards are recognized, they immediately increase the NAV of all shares, including those minted after the rewards were earned. Reward vesting delays liquidity but does not prevent this dilution of existing holders. Realizing a gain depends on the captured rewards exceeding exit costs which is unlikely under normal operation. The same stale accounting affects `lockExcessAERO()`. If excess AERO is locked before pending rewards are recognized, the reserve target is calculated from a lower NAV and may leave less liquid AERO than accounting the rewards first.
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240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026
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