Telescope

QuantstampCode version: not recorded (see the report)

Quantstamp reviewed Telescope on 2 Nov 2026: 5 findings, 0 critical; 3 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged; 1 more marked mitigated.

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Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixedMitigated
Critical0000
High0000
Medium0010
Low0221
MediumStale Withdrawal Requests Let Anyone Re-Pause the Vault After Every UnpauseFixed

`LiquidityVault` records `grossAmount` and `tAEROToBurn` when a veNFT withdrawal request is created, and only the recorded recipient can call `cancelVeNFTWithdrawal()`. If a backing loss occurs and is written down through `checkSolvency()` or `writeDownShortage()`, the vault is paused and the exchange rate is lower than it was at request time. Finalizing the request would then lower the rate further, so the circuit breaker reverts. `finalizeVeNFTWithdrawal()` is permissionless and is not blocked by the pause, and `Router` catches the revert and calls `pause()` instead of reverting, so the request stays open. As a result, anyone can pause the vault again after every timelock `unpause()`. This continues until the recipient cancels, rewards bring the rate back to the request rate, or someone donates AERO equal to the loss and calls `accountCompoundedRewards()`. While the request is open, its amount also stays in `totalPendingWithdrawals()`, which can block other holders' emergency veNFT exits in `PositionVault` once liquid AERO is used up.

LowChanges to `minLiquidityFloor` Leave Fee Snapshots StaleFixed

`setMinLiquidityFloor()` updates `minLiquidityFloor` but leaves `_epochLiquiditySnapshot` and `nextEpochLiquiditySnapshot` unchanged. Because each snapshot promotes the previously queued value before recording a new sample, the old floor can continue to affect dynamic redemption fees for up to two snapshot intervals. An increase can therefore leave fees lower than intended, while a decrease can leave users paying elevated fees.

LowSplitting Redemptions Within One Snapshot Interval Reduces Dynamic FeesFixed

`Router._calculateDynamicFee()` prices each redemption as a liquidity decrease from `L` to `L - amount`, where `amount` is the redemption value after the base fee but before the dynamic fee. However, `LiquidityVault.withdrawAERO()` removes only the net payout, leaving the AERO backing the fee shares in the vault. When a holder splits the same total `tAERO` input into successive redemptions within the same snapshot interval, each later call therefore starts with more liquidity than the preceding calculation assumed, allowing a lower aggregate dynamic fee. Fee reductions from spreading redemptions across different snapshot intervals are intentional and are not part of this issue. When either fee component is burned instead of transferred to the treasury, splitting can also increase the holder's proceeds through a separate effect. Burning fee shares while retaining their backing raises the exchange rate of the holder's remaining shares, allowing later redemptions to recover part of the holder's own earlier fees. This additional benefit depends on the holder's remaining share ownership and applies to both base and dynamic fees when burned. The holder still surrenders the redeemed shares and pays fees, but splitting can increase the total AERO received and reduce the fee compensation retained for other holders or the treasury. **Example case:** 1. A holder selects a large `tAERO` redemption while the dynamic fee is active and sufficient liquidity is available. 2. The holder divides the input into smaller amounts and submits successive `redeemAERO()` calls within the same snapshot interval. 3. Each call reduces available liquidity only by its net payout, so subsequent calls start above the liquidity endpoint assumed by the preceding fee calculation. 4. If fees are burned, the exchange rate of the holder's remaining shares also increases between calls. 5. The holder receives more AERO for the same total `tAERO` input than through a single redemption.

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Part of Telescope’s security record

Telescope
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Nov 2026, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Telescope’s security record

Security firm

Quantstamp

240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026

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