SolarX - Audit Addendum

CertiK1 address on BNB Chain

CertiK reviewed SolarX (SolarX - Audit Addendum) on 26 Mar 2024: 4 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen SolarX’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings4

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium000
Low200
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `SolarX` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint tokens to any address and burn tokens from themselves. Note there's a 700,000,000 * 10 ** 18 `MAX_TOTAL_SUPPLY` cap. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-d958-3acf5600-8212-15e6671ff16a/diagrams/centralization_SolarX-SolarX-MINTER_ROLE.svg) In the contract `SolarX` the role `PAUSER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `PAUSER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-d958-3acf5600-8212-15e6671ff16a/diagrams/centralization_SolarX-SolarX-PAUSER_ROLE.svg) In the contract `SolarX` the role `UPDATER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `UPDATER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set critical state variables. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-d958-3acf5600-8212-15e6671ff16a/diagrams/centralization_SolarX-SolarX-UPDATER_ROLE.svg) --- In the contract `AccessControl` the role `adminRole` has authority over the following functions: - grantRole() - revokeRole() Any compromise to the `adminRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grant associated role to any account or revoke the role from any account. Note that `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` is the admin role for all roles. In the contract `AccessControl` the role `role` has authority over the following function: - renounceRole() Any compromise to the `role` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce corresponding privileges to functions within other contracts.

HighInitial Token DistributionOpen

All of the SolarX tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the address may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

LowInconsistency between Comments and Code in `mint(Open

In the contract, comments within the `mint()` and `burn()` functions indicate that these functions should be called by the `UPDATER_ROLE`. However, the actual implementation restricts these functions to be called by the `MINTER_ROLE`.

LowInconsistency Between Transfer And TransferFrom LOpen

The function `transfer()` has the restriction `to != address(this)` while the function `transferFrom()` does not, which creates an inconsistency between them. This will cause the problem that users can use the `transferFrom()` function to transfer tokens to `address(this)`. ```solidity=62 require(to != address(this), "No transfers to contract allowed."); ```

Contracts in scope1

AddressChainSource code
0xa56ba554a859a011f8b10c87319f7774f534f4e0Chain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

Part of SolarX’s security record

SolarX
Audits2 audits by 1 firmLast audit Mar 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 2 reports.
Open SolarX’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

1,045 projects reviewed · 1,376 reports · latest May 2025

See CertiK’s audits

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us