CertiK reviewed SolarX (SolarX - Audit Addendum) on 26 Mar 2024: 4 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 2 | 0 | 0 |
In the contract `SolarX` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint tokens to any address and burn tokens from themselves. Note there's a 700,000,000 * 10 ** 18 `MAX_TOTAL_SUPPLY` cap.  In the contract `SolarX` the role `PAUSER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `PAUSER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the contract.  In the contract `SolarX` the role `UPDATER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `UPDATER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set critical state variables.  --- In the contract `AccessControl` the role `adminRole` has authority over the following functions: - grantRole() - revokeRole() Any compromise to the `adminRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grant associated role to any account or revoke the role from any account. Note that `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` is the admin role for all roles. In the contract `AccessControl` the role `role` has authority over the following function: - renounceRole() Any compromise to the `role` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce corresponding privileges to functions within other contracts.
All of the SolarX tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the address may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
In the contract, comments within the `mint()` and `burn()` functions indicate that these functions should be called by the `UPDATER_ROLE`. However, the actual implementation restricts these functions to be called by the `MINTER_ROLE`.
The function `transfer()` has the restriction `to != address(this)` while the function `transferFrom()` does not, which creates an inconsistency between them. This will cause the problem that users can use the `transferFrom()` function to transfer tokens to `address(this)`. ```solidity=62 require(to != address(this), "No transfers to contract allowed."); ```
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xa56b…f4e00xa56ba554a859a011f8b10c87319f7774f534f4e0 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
1,045 projects reviewed · 1,376 reports · latest May 2025
See CertiK’s auditsSomething wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.
Tell us