SolarX audit reports

BNB Chain, Polygon (POS)solarx.ai

SolarX has 2 public audit reports from CertiK; the latest is CertiK, 26 Mar 2024; no critical findings reported. It also holds 2 deployed contracts on 2 chains.

Critical findings
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Across 2 reports.
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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm7

Statuses are the security firms’ own

7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 5 high, 2 low (all open).

High
5
Low
2
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    SolarX - Audit Addendum · CertiK · 26 Mar 2024 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    SolarX - Audit Addendum · CertiK · 26 Mar 2024 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralization Risks in SolarX.sol

    SolarX - Audit · CertiK · 18 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    SolarX - Audit · CertiK · 18 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Minting Centralization Risk

    SolarX - Audit · CertiK · 18 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Inconsistency between Comments and Code in `mint(

    SolarX - Audit Addendum · CertiK · 26 Mar 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Inconsistency Between Transfer And TransferFrom L

    SolarX - Audit Addendum · CertiK · 26 Mar 2024 · Report ↗

Audits2

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
SolarX - Audit AddendumSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on BNB ChainNone openFindings: 2 high · 2 low
4 open
skynet.certik.com ↗
SolarX - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on Polygon (POS)None openFindings: 3 high
3 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings7

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High500
Medium000
Low200
HighCentralization Related RisksSolarX - Audit Addendum · CertiK · 26 Mar 2024Open

In the contract `SolarX` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint tokens to any address and burn tokens from themselves. Note there's a 700,000,000 * 10 ** 18 `MAX_TOTAL_SUPPLY` cap. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-d958-3acf5600-8212-15e6671ff16a/diagrams/centralization_SolarX-SolarX-MINTER_ROLE.svg) In the contract `SolarX` the role `PAUSER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `PAUSER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause/unpause the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-d958-3acf5600-8212-15e6671ff16a/diagrams/centralization_SolarX-SolarX-PAUSER_ROLE.svg) In the contract `SolarX` the role `UPDATER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `UPDATER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set critical state variables. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-d958-3acf5600-8212-15e6671ff16a/diagrams/centralization_SolarX-SolarX-UPDATER_ROLE.svg) --- In the contract `AccessControl` the role `adminRole` has authority over the following functions: - grantRole() - revokeRole() Any compromise to the `adminRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grant associated role to any account or revoke the role from any account. Note that `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` is the admin role for all roles. In the contract `AccessControl` the role `role` has authority over the following function: - renounceRole() Any compromise to the `role` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce corresponding privileges to functions within other contracts.

Open the report
HighInitial Token DistributionSolarX - Audit Addendum · CertiK · 26 Mar 2024Open

All of the SolarX tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the address may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

Open the report
HighCentralization Risks in SolarX.solSolarX - Audit · CertiK · 18 Aug 2023Open

In the contract `AccessControl` the role `adminRole` has authority over the following functions: - grantRole() - revokeRole() Any compromise to the `adminRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grant associated role to any account or revoke the role from any account. Note that `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` is the admin role for all roles. ----------- In the contract `AccessControl` the role `role` has authority over the following function: - renounceRole() Any compromise to the `role` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce corresponding privileges to functions within other contracts. --- In the contract `SolarX` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint tokens. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-3d0e-9cb4b8b0-b312-c33e0745c233/diagrams/centralization_SolarX-SolarX-MINTER_ROLE.svg) --- In the contract `SolarX` the role `UPDATER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `UPDATER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the variables `miningPoolAddress`, `commissionPercentage`, and `MAX_ALLOWED_BURN_AMOUNT`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-3d0e-9cb4b8b0-b312-c33e0745c233/diagrams/centralization_SolarX-SolarX-UPDATER_ROLE.svg) --- In the contract `SolarX` the role `advisors` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `advisors` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and burn their tokens. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-3d0e-9cb4b8b0-b312-c33e0745c233/diagrams/centralization_SolarX-SolarX-advisors.svg)

Open the report
HighInitial Token DistributionSolarX - Audit · CertiK · 18 Aug 2023Open

`initialSupply` amount of tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to the address may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

Open the report
HighMinting Centralization RiskSolarX - Audit · CertiK · 18 Aug 2023Open

The role `MINTER_ROLE` has the authority to mint an arbitrary amount of tokens to an arbitrary address. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint a huge amount of tokens to themselves.

Open the report
LowInconsistency between Comments and Code in `mint(SolarX - Audit Addendum · CertiK · 26 Mar 2024Open

In the contract, comments within the `mint()` and `burn()` functions indicate that these functions should be called by the `UPDATER_ROLE`. However, the actual implementation restricts these functions to be called by the `MINTER_ROLE`.

Open the report
LowInconsistency Between Transfer And TransferFrom LSolarX - Audit Addendum · CertiK · 26 Mar 2024Open

The function `transfer()` has the restriction `to != address(this)` while the function `transferFrom()` does not, which creates an inconsistency between them. This will cause the problem that users can use the `transferFrom()` function to transfer tokens to `address(this)`. ```solidity=62 require(to != address(this), "No transfers to contract allowed."); ```

Open the report

Contracts2

AddressChainSource code
0xa56ba554a859a011f8b10c87319f7774f534f4e0Chain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source
0x6d295da283c4c0658eafe608e4145e8a86777b88Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source

SolarX: questions

Is SolarX audited?

Trustblock holds 2 public audit reports for SolarX, dated 18 Aug 2023 to 26 Mar 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“SolarX - Audit Addendum”).

Who audited SolarX?

CertiK wrote the 2 reports Trustblock holds for SolarX.

Are there open findings in SolarX’s audits?

7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 5 high, 2 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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