Ignore Fud Bridge

CertiK1 address on BNB Chain

CertiK reviewed 4. Ignore Fud (Ignore Fud Bridge) on 16 May 2023: 8 findings, 0 critical; 6 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged, 1 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen 4. Ignore Fud’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings8

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High104
Medium002
Low010
HighPotential Rug Pull Risks Introduced by CentralizeOpen

In the contract `LzApp` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - set configuration of the LayerZero endpoint - set the send version of the LayerZero endpoint - set the receive version of the LayerZero endpoint - resume the message flow in blocking mode and clear the stored payload - set the trusted path for the cross-chain communication - set the trusted remote address - set precrime - set the minimum gas parameter for a packet type on a given chain - set payload size limit ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/fa9e1ce7554b467fa8b1df69bb540905/diagrams/centralization_WrappedTokenBridge-LzApp-_owner.svg) In the contract `TokenBridgeBase` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - set the `useCustomAdapterParams` flag indicating whether the contract uses custom adapter parameters or the default ones ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/fa9e1ce7554b467fa8b1df69bb540905/diagrams/centralization_WrappedTokenBridge-TokenBridgeBase-_owner.svg) In the contract `WrappedTokenBridge` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - register a token supported in this bridge - set withdrawal fee bps ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/fa9e1ce7554b467fa8b1df69bb540905/diagrams/centralization_WrappedTokenBridge-WrappedTokenBridge-_owner.svg) In the contract `OriginalTokenBridge` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and - register a token supported in this bridge and set the decimals - set remote chain id - withdraw fee from the contract ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/8e9847ba11674ee3a20bc33a5765245e/diagrams/centralization_OriginalTokenBridge-OriginalTokenBridge-_owner.svg) **Improper configuration of the above bridge parameters could compromise the functionality of the bridge, obstruct message transmission, or even result in the lockout or theft of users' funds.** **More details can be found in finding OTB-02 and OTB-04, **

Contracts in scope1

AddressChainSource code
0x04cbefb3d208172336f74448d529148b429d4d7fChain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

Part of 4. Ignore Fud’s security record

4. Ignore Fud
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit May 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open 4. Ignore Fud’s security record

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CertiK

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