Seedify layer zero

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Seedify (Seedify layer zero) on 3 Oct 2024: 8 findings, 0 critical; 5 marked fixed, 3 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Seedify’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings8

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium000
Low105
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

**Note:** The finding only concerns those centralized functions within the scope of the audit, and does not include those which may exist within the contract due to out-of-scope inheritances. ### LzIDO.sol In the contract `LzIDO`, the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the refund period both in the `LzIDO` contract and in the corresponding cross-chain `LzLinearVesting` contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-6487-cffc8490-9283-27759e73cfd4/diagrams/centralization_LzIDO-LzIDO-DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `LzIDO`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the destination chain id from its original, changing the chain the contract sends messages to and receives messages from. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-6487-cffc8490-9283-27759e73cfd4/diagrams/centralization_LzIDO-LzIDO-_owner.svg) --- ### LzLinearVesting.sol In the contract `LzLinearVesting`, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the destination chain id from its original, changing the chain the contract sends messages to and receives messages from. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-6487-cffc8490-9283-27759e73cfd4/diagrams/centralization_LzLinearVesting-LzLinearVesting-_owner.svg)

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeOpen

In the contract `INO`, the role `admin` has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the contract. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract appointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.

LowUnnecessary Setting of `ido` AddressOpen

The following comment is above the constructor of `LzLinearVesting`: ```solidity // @param _ido The IDO contract address - only to set on NON CROSSCHAIN IDO. ``` Within the constructor, `LinearVestingStorage.layout().isCrosschainIDO` is set to `true`, confirming that setting the `ido` state is unnecessary.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (3)

  • src/ido/lzApp/LzIDO.sol
  • src/ino/INO.sol
  • src/linearvesting/lzApp/LzLinearVesting.sol

Part of Seedify’s security record

Seedify
Audits9 audits by 2 firmsLast audit Oct 2025, by Hacken.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 9 reports, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open Seedify’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

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