Miracle Play - Audit

CertiK3 addresses on Polygon (POS)

CertiK reviewed Miracle Play (Miracle Play - Audit) on 21 Jun 2024: 16 findings, 1 critical; 9 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged, 3 open.

1 critical finding, fixed
Open the reportOpen Miracle Play’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings16

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical001
High301
Medium005
Low042
HighCentralization RisksOpen

In the contract `TokenMigrateERC20` the role `MIGRATION_ROLE` has authority over the functions `setMerkleRoot()`. Any compromise to the `MIGRATION_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `ownershipMerkleRoot`. In the contract `TokenERC20M` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set `primarySaleRecipient`, `platformFeeBps`, `platformFeeRecipient`, and `contractURI`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-1d58-8ff9b910-97f8-776f48e5637c/diagrams/centralization_TokenERC20M-TokenERC20M-DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `BridgeCore` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions `changeFeeRecipient()`. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `feeRecipient`. In the contract `ERC1155Staking` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions as follows: - `adminUnstakeUser()`, to unstake tokens on behalf of a user. - `adminUnstakeAll()`, to unstake all tokens from all users. - `confiscateERC1155FromUser()`, to confiscate staked ERC-1155 tokens from a specific user. - `setDaoAddress()`, to change the value of `daoAddress`. - `setManagerFeeWallet()`, to change the value of `ManagerWallet`. - `setDAOFeePercentage()`, to change the value of `DAO_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setFeeManagerPercentage()`, to change the value of `MANAGER_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setAgentFeePercentage()`, to change the value of `AGENT_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setPoolStartTime()`, to change the value of `poolStartTime`. - `setPoolFinished()`, to change the value of `POOL_FINISHED`.

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeOpen

In the contract `Bridge`, the role admin has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the `Bridge` contract. Any compromise to the admin account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.

HighMinting and Claiming Centralization RisksOpen

In the contract `TokenERC20M` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint any amount of tokens to any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-1d58-8ff9b910-97f8-776f48e5637c/diagrams/centralization_TokenERC20M-TokenERC20M-MINTER_ROLE.svg) In the contract `BridgeCore` the role `minterAndBurnerRole` has authority over the functions as follows: - `sendERC1155ToUser()`, to mint Drop1155 to order receiver. - `sendERC20ToUser()`, to mint TokenERC20 to order receiver. Any compromise to the `minterAndBurnerRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `ERC1155Staking` the role `FACTORY_ROLE` has authority over the functions `claimAgent()`. Any compromise to the `FACTORY_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and claim the reward for a user.

Contracts in scope3

AddressChainSource code
0x5755241a4c8afef6166b1fa361294222eff0ea88Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source
0x87d6f8edeccbcca766d2880d19b2c3777d322c22Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source
0x625d3fd726cc86f1463b50376dec62359d61a1f0Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source

Part of Miracle Play’s security record

Miracle Play
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jun 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn that report, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open Miracle Play’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

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