CertiK reviewed Miracle Play (Miracle Play - Audit) on 21 Jun 2024: 16 findings, 1 critical; 9 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged, 3 open.
Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| High | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Low | 0 | 4 | 2 |
In the contract `TokenMigrateERC20` the role `MIGRATION_ROLE` has authority over the functions `setMerkleRoot()`. Any compromise to the `MIGRATION_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `ownershipMerkleRoot`. In the contract `TokenERC20M` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set `primarySaleRecipient`, `platformFeeBps`, `platformFeeRecipient`, and `contractURI`.  In the contract `BridgeCore` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions `changeFeeRecipient()`. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `feeRecipient`. In the contract `ERC1155Staking` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions as follows: - `adminUnstakeUser()`, to unstake tokens on behalf of a user. - `adminUnstakeAll()`, to unstake all tokens from all users. - `confiscateERC1155FromUser()`, to confiscate staked ERC-1155 tokens from a specific user. - `setDaoAddress()`, to change the value of `daoAddress`. - `setManagerFeeWallet()`, to change the value of `ManagerWallet`. - `setDAOFeePercentage()`, to change the value of `DAO_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setFeeManagerPercentage()`, to change the value of `MANAGER_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setAgentFeePercentage()`, to change the value of `AGENT_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setPoolStartTime()`, to change the value of `poolStartTime`. - `setPoolFinished()`, to change the value of `POOL_FINISHED`.
In the contract `Bridge`, the role admin has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the `Bridge` contract. Any compromise to the admin account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.
In the contract `TokenERC20M` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint any amount of tokens to any address.  In the contract `BridgeCore` the role `minterAndBurnerRole` has authority over the functions as follows: - `sendERC1155ToUser()`, to mint Drop1155 to order receiver. - `sendERC20ToUser()`, to mint TokenERC20 to order receiver. Any compromise to the `minterAndBurnerRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `ERC1155Staking` the role `FACTORY_ROLE` has authority over the functions `claimAgent()`. Any compromise to the `FACTORY_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and claim the reward for a user.
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x5755…ea880x5755241a4c8afef6166b1fa361294222eff0ea88 | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x87d6…2c220x87d6f8edeccbcca766d2880d19b2c3777d322c22 | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x625d…a1f00x625d3fd726cc86f1463b50376dec62359d61a1f0 | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
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