Miracle Play has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 21 Jun 2024; 1 critical finding, marked fixed by the firm. It also holds 3 deployed contracts on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 4 low (3 open, 4 acknowledged).
Centralization Risks
Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Centralized Control of Contract Upgrade
Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Minting and Claiming Centralization Risks
Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Cross Chain Swap Dependencies
Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Missing Zero Address Validation
Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Redundant Code Components
Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Third-Party Dependency Usage
Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Miracle Play - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 3 addresses on Polygon (POS) | 1 critical finding, fixed | Findings: 1 critical · 4 high · 5 medium · 6 low 9 fixed · 4 acknowledged · 3 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| High | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Low | 0 | 4 | 2 |
In the contract `TokenMigrateERC20` the role `MIGRATION_ROLE` has authority over the functions `setMerkleRoot()`. Any compromise to the `MIGRATION_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `ownershipMerkleRoot`. In the contract `TokenERC20M` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set `primarySaleRecipient`, `platformFeeBps`, `platformFeeRecipient`, and `contractURI`.  In the contract `BridgeCore` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions `changeFeeRecipient()`. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `feeRecipient`. In the contract `ERC1155Staking` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions as follows: - `adminUnstakeUser()`, to unstake tokens on behalf of a user. - `adminUnstakeAll()`, to unstake all tokens from all users. - `confiscateERC1155FromUser()`, to confiscate staked ERC-1155 tokens from a specific user. - `setDaoAddress()`, to change the value of `daoAddress`. - `setManagerFeeWallet()`, to change the value of `ManagerWallet`. - `setDAOFeePercentage()`, to change the value of `DAO_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setFeeManagerPercentage()`, to change the value of `MANAGER_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setAgentFeePercentage()`, to change the value of `AGENT_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setPoolStartTime()`, to change the value of `poolStartTime`. - `setPoolFinished()`, to change the value of `POOL_FINISHED`.
Open the reportIn the contract `Bridge`, the role admin has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the `Bridge` contract. Any compromise to the admin account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.
Open the reportIn the contract `TokenERC20M` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint any amount of tokens to any address.  In the contract `BridgeCore` the role `minterAndBurnerRole` has authority over the functions as follows: - `sendERC1155ToUser()`, to mint Drop1155 to order receiver. - `sendERC20ToUser()`, to mint TokenERC20 to order receiver. Any compromise to the `minterAndBurnerRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `ERC1155Staking` the role `FACTORY_ROLE` has authority over the functions `claimAgent()`. Any compromise to the `FACTORY_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and claim the reward for a user.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x5755…ea880x5755241a4c8afef6166b1fa361294222eff0ea88 | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x87d6…2c220x87d6f8edeccbcca766d2880d19b2c3777d322c22 | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x625d…a1f00x625d3fd726cc86f1463b50376dec62359d61a1f0 | Chain: Polygon (POS) | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Miracle Play, dated 21 Jun 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Miracle Play - Audit”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Miracle Play.
7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 4 low (3 open, 4 acknowledged). Of 1 critical finding: marked fixed by the firm. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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