Miracle Play security record

As of 8 Nov 2026, Miracle Play has 1 audit report on Trustblock, by CertiK, dated 21 Jun 2024. That report lists no open critical findings. It also holds 3 deployed contracts on 1 chain.

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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits1

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ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsSource
Miracle Play - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 3 addresses on Polygon (POS)1 critical finding, fixedskynet.certik.com ↗

Findings16

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical001
High301
Medium005
Low042
HighCentralization RisksMiracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024Open

In the contract `TokenMigrateERC20` the role `MIGRATION_ROLE` has authority over the functions `setMerkleRoot()`. Any compromise to the `MIGRATION_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `ownershipMerkleRoot`. In the contract `TokenERC20M` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set `primarySaleRecipient`, `platformFeeBps`, `platformFeeRecipient`, and `contractURI`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-1d58-8ff9b910-97f8-776f48e5637c/diagrams/centralization_TokenERC20M-TokenERC20M-DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `BridgeCore` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions `changeFeeRecipient()`. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `feeRecipient`. In the contract `ERC1155Staking` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions as follows: - `adminUnstakeUser()`, to unstake tokens on behalf of a user. - `adminUnstakeAll()`, to unstake all tokens from all users. - `confiscateERC1155FromUser()`, to confiscate staked ERC-1155 tokens from a specific user. - `setDaoAddress()`, to change the value of `daoAddress`. - `setManagerFeeWallet()`, to change the value of `ManagerWallet`. - `setDAOFeePercentage()`, to change the value of `DAO_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setFeeManagerPercentage()`, to change the value of `MANAGER_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setAgentFeePercentage()`, to change the value of `AGENT_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setPoolStartTime()`, to change the value of `poolStartTime`. - `setPoolFinished()`, to change the value of `POOL_FINISHED`.

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HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeMiracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024Open

In the contract `Bridge`, the role admin has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the `Bridge` contract. Any compromise to the admin account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.

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HighMinting and Claiming Centralization RisksMiracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024Open

In the contract `TokenERC20M` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint any amount of tokens to any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-1d58-8ff9b910-97f8-776f48e5637c/diagrams/centralization_TokenERC20M-TokenERC20M-MINTER_ROLE.svg) In the contract `BridgeCore` the role `minterAndBurnerRole` has authority over the functions as follows: - `sendERC1155ToUser()`, to mint Drop1155 to order receiver. - `sendERC20ToUser()`, to mint TokenERC20 to order receiver. Any compromise to the `minterAndBurnerRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `ERC1155Staking` the role `FACTORY_ROLE` has authority over the functions `claimAgent()`. Any compromise to the `FACTORY_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and claim the reward for a user.

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Contracts3

AddressChainSource code
0x5755241a4c8afef6166b1fa361294222eff0ea88Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source
0x87d6f8edeccbcca766d2880d19b2c3777d322c22Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source
0x625d3fd726cc86f1463b50376dec62359d61a1f0Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source

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