Miracle Play audit reports

Miracle Play has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 21 Jun 2024; 1 critical finding, marked fixed by the firm. It also holds 3 deployed contracts on 1 chain.

Critical findings
No open critical findings
In that report, 1 critical finding was reported. It is marked fixed by the firm that reported it. See the findings
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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm7

Statuses are the security firms’ own

7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 4 low (3 open, 4 acknowledged).

High
3
Low
4
  • High Open

    Centralization Risks

    Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralized Control of Contract Upgrade

    Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Minting and Claiming Centralization Risks

    Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Acknowledged

    Cross Chain Swap Dependencies

    Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Acknowledged

    Missing Zero Address Validation

    Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Acknowledged

    Redundant Code Components

    Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

  • Low Acknowledged

    Third-Party Dependency Usage

    Miracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Miracle Play - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 3 addresses on Polygon (POS)1 critical finding, fixedFindings: 1 critical · 4 high · 5 medium · 6 low
9 fixed · 4 acknowledged · 3 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings16

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical001
High301
Medium005
Low042
HighCentralization RisksMiracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024Open

In the contract `TokenMigrateERC20` the role `MIGRATION_ROLE` has authority over the functions `setMerkleRoot()`. Any compromise to the `MIGRATION_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `ownershipMerkleRoot`. In the contract `TokenERC20M` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set `primarySaleRecipient`, `platformFeeBps`, `platformFeeRecipient`, and `contractURI`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-1d58-8ff9b910-97f8-776f48e5637c/diagrams/centralization_TokenERC20M-TokenERC20M-DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `BridgeCore` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions `changeFeeRecipient()`. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `feeRecipient`. In the contract `ERC1155Staking` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions as follows: - `adminUnstakeUser()`, to unstake tokens on behalf of a user. - `adminUnstakeAll()`, to unstake all tokens from all users. - `confiscateERC1155FromUser()`, to confiscate staked ERC-1155 tokens from a specific user. - `setDaoAddress()`, to change the value of `daoAddress`. - `setManagerFeeWallet()`, to change the value of `ManagerWallet`. - `setDAOFeePercentage()`, to change the value of `DAO_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setFeeManagerPercentage()`, to change the value of `MANAGER_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setAgentFeePercentage()`, to change the value of `AGENT_FEE_PERCENTAGE`. - `setPoolStartTime()`, to change the value of `poolStartTime`. - `setPoolFinished()`, to change the value of `POOL_FINISHED`.

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HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeMiracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024Open

In the contract `Bridge`, the role admin has the authority to update the implementation contract behind the `Bridge` contract. Any compromise to the admin account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract which is pointed by proxy and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.

Open the report
HighMinting and Claiming Centralization RisksMiracle Play - Audit · CertiK · 21 Jun 2024Open

In the contract `TokenERC20M` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint any amount of tokens to any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ef-1d58-8ff9b910-97f8-776f48e5637c/diagrams/centralization_TokenERC20M-TokenERC20M-MINTER_ROLE.svg) In the contract `BridgeCore` the role `minterAndBurnerRole` has authority over the functions as follows: - `sendERC1155ToUser()`, to mint Drop1155 to order receiver. - `sendERC20ToUser()`, to mint TokenERC20 to order receiver. Any compromise to the `minterAndBurnerRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `ERC1155Staking` the role `FACTORY_ROLE` has authority over the functions `claimAgent()`. Any compromise to the `FACTORY_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and claim the reward for a user.

Open the report

Contracts3

AddressChainSource code
0x5755241a4c8afef6166b1fa361294222eff0ea88Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source
0x87d6f8edeccbcca766d2880d19b2c3777d322c22Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source
0x625d3fd726cc86f1463b50376dec62359d61a1f0Chain: Polygon (POS)Source code: Verified source

Miracle Play: questions

Is Miracle Play audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Miracle Play, dated 21 Jun 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Miracle Play - Audit”).

Who audited Miracle Play?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Miracle Play.

Are there open findings in Miracle Play’s audits?

7 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 4 low (3 open, 4 acknowledged). Of 1 critical finding: marked fixed by the firm. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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