Lif3 - vaults - SC

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed LIF3 (Lif3 - vaults - SC) on 9 Feb 2023: 9 findings, 0 critical; 5 marked fixed, 2 acknowledged, 2 open.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

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Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High020
Medium001
Low204
HighCentralization Risks in LockingRewardPool.solAcknowledged

In the contract `LockingRewardPool` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below, as well as the privilege to assign/revoke all roles. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and arbitrarily set the lower limit of deposit amount, and assign/revoke privileged roles. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a1e885a22f514a839d36a2a9db15b489/diagrams/centralization_LockingRewardPool-LockingRewardPool-DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `LockingRewardPool` the role `RECOVERER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `RECOVERER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and withdraw any token that's not involved in the lock and reward process. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a1e885a22f514a839d36a2a9db15b489/diagrams/centralization_LockingRewardPool-LockingRewardPool-RECOVERER_ROLE.svg) In the contract `LockingRewardPool` the role `REWARD_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `REWARD_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add and update the reward tokens and related reward rate. Notice that changing the reward token decimal will result in the reset of current reward distribution. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a1e885a22f514a839d36a2a9db15b489/diagrams/centralization_LockingRewardPool-LockingRewardPool-REWARD_ADMIN_ROLE.svg) In the contract `LockingRewardPool` the role `TAX_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `TAX_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and arbitrarily set the fee rates and fee exemption. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a1e885a22f514a839d36a2a9db15b489/diagrams/centralization_LockingRewardPool-LockingRewardPool-TAX_ADMIN_ROLE.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in LockNFT.solAcknowledged

In the contract `LockNFT` the role `CREATOR_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `CREATOR_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and arbitrarily mint lock NFT. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a1e885a22f514a839d36a2a9db15b489/diagrams/centralization_LockNFT-LockNFT-CREATOR_ROLE.svg) In the contract `LockNFT` the role `DESTROYER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DESTROYER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and arbitrarily burn lock NFT. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/a1e885a22f514a839d36a2a9db15b489/diagrams/centralization_LockNFT-LockNFT-DESTROYER_ROLE.svg) In addition, the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has the authority to grant and renounce the `CREATOR_ROLE` and `DESTROYER_ROLE` roles, as provided by the inherited contract `AccessControl`. Any compromise to the `DESTROYER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and take over privileged role's management.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • LockingRewardPool.sol
  • LockNFT.sol

Part of LIF3’s security record

LIF3
Audits3 audits by 2 firmsLast audit Feb 2024, by CertiK.
Critical findings1 critical acknowledged, not fixedReported in “Lif3 L3USD” by CertiK, Feb 2024. The team acknowledged it.
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