Part of Quantstamp’s series
Quantstamp reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus protocol (vaults)) on 19 May 2023: 16 findings, 0 critical; 10 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged, 2 open; 4 more marked mitigated.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed | Mitigated |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Low | 2 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
The firm marks these findings Mitigated. They are not counted as open, acknowledged or fixed.
The XVS Vault allows anyone to `claim()` a user's interest in any pool. Typically, this is not an issue when the pool has enough rewards to be claimed. However, the XVS vault is limited in its ability to distribute rewards by the number of rewards available in `XVSStore`. If there are not enough rewards at the time the staker claims, they will get fewer rewards than they should. If the rewards are insufficient, stakers would rather wait until they become enough to claim. However, anyone can claim them and force them to lose some part of their rewards. A similar issue exists when claiming the XVS rewards in the VAI vault.
According to the code comments, the `getStakeAmount()` function ``` @notice Get the XVS stake balance of an account (excluding the pending withdrawals) ``` However, the returned stake amount only accounts for the pool whose pool and rewards tokens are both XVS. In other words, deposits in pools whose pool token is XVS but the rewards token is not XVS are not considered valid XVS stake balance.
It is important to validate inputs, even if they only come from trusted addresses, to avoid human error. The following functions do not have a proper validation of input parameters: 1. `XVSVault.add()` does not check: 1. that parameters `_rewardToken` and `_token` are different from `address(0)`. 1. that parameters `_rewardPerBlock` and `_lockPeriod` are non-zero. 1. `XVSVault.setXvsStore()` does not check: 1. that parameters `_xvs` and `_xvsStore` are different from `address(0)`. 1. `XVSStore.setPendingAdmin()` does not check: 1. that parameter `_admin` is different from `address(0)`. 1. that parameter `_admin` is different from the previous admin address. 1. `XVSStore.setNewOwner()` does not check: 1. that parameter `_owner` is different from the previous owner address.
The function `VAIVault.safeXVSTransfer()` transfers whatever XVS it can given the contract's balance, but `VAIVault._withdraw()` and `VAIVault.deposit()` both update the `user.rewardDebt` as if the full payout was delivered. `XVSStore.safeRewardTransfer()` and its usages exhibit the same behavior.
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