Metapolitans-MAPS

CertiK1 address on Ethereum

CertiK reviewed Metapolitans (Metapolitans-MAPS) on 21 Jun 2023: 20 findings, 0 critical; 12 marked fixed, 8 open.

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Findings20

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium002
Low6010
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

In the contract `BaseErc20` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization_BaseErc20-BaseErc20-_owner.svg) In the contract `Taxable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization_Taxable-Taxable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Burnable` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization_Burnable-Burnable-owner.svg) In the contract `AntiSniper` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization_AntiSniper-AntiSniper-owner.svg) In the contract `Metapolitans` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization__Metapolitans-Metapolitans-_owner.svg) In the contract `TaxDistributor` the role `_token` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_token` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. Additionally, the design of these functions indicates that the `_token` role must be either the `Taxable` or `Metapolitans` contract in order for the design to function properly. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization_TaxDistributor-TaxDistributor-_token.svg)

HighInitial Token DistributionOpen

All of the **MAPS** tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

Low`ConfigurationChanged` event lacks parametersOpen

The event `ConfigurationChanged` lacks a parameter to display detailed information about the update, making it impossible to record historical data through this event. For example, when setting `exchanges[who] = isExchange`, the `isExchange` could be either true or false, but the emitted event would always be `change to exchange list`.

LowLack of reasonable boundaryOpen

The variables `minAmount`, `minTime`, and `taxAmount` do not have reasonable boundaries, so they can be given arbitrarily values by the `owner`.

LowLogical issue of function `distribute()`Open

As per the finding TDH-05, there will be a certain amount of BNBs remaining in the contract, hence the check `amountBNB == amts[1]` will always fail as it assumes that all BNBs have originated from the swap. This implies that the event will be emitted every time.

LowMissing Emit EventsOpen

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

LowPotential Sandwich AttacksOpen

A sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by back running (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `_router.swapExactTokensForETH()` - `_router.addLiquidityETH()`

LowThe absence of the `_useSafeTransfer` and `excludOpen

The setting function for `_useSafeTransfer` is not available, so it will always default to zero. As a result, the subsequent code is unnecessary. ```solidity function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 value) private { ... if (_useSafeTransfer) { _balances[from] = _balances[from] - value; _balances[to] = _balances[to] + value; emit Transfer(from, to, value); } else { ... } } ``` In addition, the function to set `excludedFromSelling[from]` is missing as well, thus the list of exclusions cannot be added.

Contracts in scope1

AddressChainSource code
0x9a6aea7c2b0d563eab701e3255110d30f08b5a64Chain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

Part of Metapolitans’s security record

Metapolitans
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Jun 2023, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
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