Metapolitans has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 21 Jun 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 6 low (all open).
Centralization Related Risks
Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Initial Token Distribution
Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
`ConfigurationChanged` event lacks parameters
Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Lack of reasonable boundary
Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Logical issue of function `distribute()`
Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Missing Emit Events
Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Potential Sandwich Attacks
Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
The absence of the `_useSafeTransfer` and `exclud
Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Metapolitans-MAPS | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | None open | Findings: 2 high · 2 medium · 16 low 12 fixed · 8 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Low | 6 | 0 | 10 |
In the contract `BaseErc20` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `Taxable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `Burnable` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `AntiSniper` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `Metapolitans` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `TaxDistributor` the role `_token` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_token` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. Additionally, the design of these functions indicates that the `_token` role must be either the `Taxable` or `Metapolitans` contract in order for the design to function properly. 
Open the reportAll of the **MAPS** tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.
Open the reportThe event `ConfigurationChanged` lacks a parameter to display detailed information about the update, making it impossible to record historical data through this event. For example, when setting `exchanges[who] = isExchange`, the `isExchange` could be either true or false, but the emitted event would always be `change to exchange list`.
Open the reportThe variables `minAmount`, `minTime`, and `taxAmount` do not have reasonable boundaries, so they can be given arbitrarily values by the `owner`.
Open the reportAs per the finding TDH-05, there will be a certain amount of BNBs remaining in the contract, hence the check `amountBNB == amts[1]` will always fail as it assumes that all BNBs have originated from the swap. This implies that the event will be emitted every time.
Open the reportThere should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
Open the reportA sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by back running (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `_router.swapExactTokensForETH()` - `_router.addLiquidityETH()`
Open the reportThe setting function for `_useSafeTransfer` is not available, so it will always default to zero. As a result, the subsequent code is unnecessary. ```solidity function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 value) private { ... if (_useSafeTransfer) { _balances[from] = _balances[from] - value; _balances[to] = _balances[to] + value; emit Transfer(from, to, value); } else { ... } } ``` In addition, the function to set `excludedFromSelling[from]` is missing as well, thus the list of exclusions cannot be added.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x9a6a…5a640x9a6aea7c2b0d563eab701e3255110d30f08b5a64 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Metapolitans, dated 21 Jun 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“Metapolitans-MAPS”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Metapolitans.
8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 6 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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