Metapolitans audit reports

Metapolitans has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 21 Jun 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

Critical findings
No open critical findings
In 1 report.
Open the latest report
Your label, live
Get the label for your site

Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm8

Statuses are the security firms’ own

8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 6 low (all open).

High
2
Low
6
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    `ConfigurationChanged` event lacks parameters

    Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Lack of reasonable boundary

    Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Logical issue of function `distribute()`

    Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Missing Emit Events

    Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Potential Sandwich Attacks

    Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    The absence of the `_useSafeTransfer` and `exclud

    Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Metapolitans-MAPSSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on EthereumNone openFindings: 2 high · 2 medium · 16 low
12 fixed · 8 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings20

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium002
Low6010
HighCentralization Related RisksMetapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023Open

In the contract `BaseErc20` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization_BaseErc20-BaseErc20-_owner.svg) In the contract `Taxable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization_Taxable-Taxable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Burnable` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization_Burnable-Burnable-owner.svg) In the contract `AntiSniper` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization_AntiSniper-AntiSniper-owner.svg) In the contract `Metapolitans` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization__Metapolitans-Metapolitans-_owner.svg) In the contract `TaxDistributor` the role `_token` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_token` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. Additionally, the design of these functions indicates that the `_token` role must be either the `Taxable` or `Metapolitans` contract in order for the design to function properly. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/89f4ccc3d02d41f285b511c2bda95abe/diagrams/centralization_TaxDistributor-TaxDistributor-_token.svg)

Open the report
HighInitial Token DistributionMetapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023Open

All of the **MAPS** tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This is a centralization risk because the deployer can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

Open the report
Low`ConfigurationChanged` event lacks parametersMetapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023Open

The event `ConfigurationChanged` lacks a parameter to display detailed information about the update, making it impossible to record historical data through this event. For example, when setting `exchanges[who] = isExchange`, the `isExchange` could be either true or false, but the emitted event would always be `change to exchange list`.

Open the report
LowLack of reasonable boundaryMetapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023Open

The variables `minAmount`, `minTime`, and `taxAmount` do not have reasonable boundaries, so they can be given arbitrarily values by the `owner`.

Open the report
LowLogical issue of function `distribute()`Metapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023Open

As per the finding TDH-05, there will be a certain amount of BNBs remaining in the contract, hence the check `amountBNB == amts[1]` will always fail as it assumes that all BNBs have originated from the swap. This implies that the event will be emitted every time.

Open the report
LowMissing Emit EventsMetapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023Open

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

Open the report
LowPotential Sandwich AttacksMetapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023Open

A sandwich attack may happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (executing before the target) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by back running (executing after the target) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `_router.swapExactTokensForETH()` - `_router.addLiquidityETH()`

Open the report
LowThe absence of the `_useSafeTransfer` and `excludMetapolitans-MAPS · CertiK · 21 Jun 2023Open

The setting function for `_useSafeTransfer` is not available, so it will always default to zero. As a result, the subsequent code is unnecessary. ```solidity function _transfer(address from, address to, uint256 value) private { ... if (_useSafeTransfer) { _balances[from] = _balances[from] - value; _balances[to] = _balances[to] + value; emit Transfer(from, to, value); } else { ... } } ``` In addition, the function to set `excludedFromSelling[from]` is missing as well, thus the list of exclusions cannot be added.

Open the report

Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0x9a6aea7c2b0d563eab701e3255110d30f08b5a64Chain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

Metapolitans: questions

Is Metapolitans audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Metapolitans, dated 21 Jun 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“Metapolitans-MAPS”).

Who audited Metapolitans?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Metapolitans.

Are there open findings in Metapolitans’s audits?

8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 6 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

Show this on your site

Is this your project? Show this record on your own website. The label states what the record holds, links to this page and updates by itself. It is free and needs no sign-in.

Content

Facts

Automatic: the three strongest facts of this project’s own record (its last audit and two more), highlighted. They update with the record. Picking a fact turns Automatic off.

Fixed as
Language

Style

Layout
Theme
Accent
Corners

Format

Size
Date
Embed as
HTML
<head>
<script src="https://widget.trustblock.run/project-widget.min.js" defer></script>
</head>
<body>
<div
data-tb-project-widget
data-tb-project-slug="metapolitans"
></div>
</body>

Paste the code where the label should appear. It uses no API credit and updates by itself.

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us