Venus - Force Liquidations

CertiKFiles named in the report

Audit

Part of CertiK’s series

CertiK reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus - Force Liquidations) on 16 Sep 2023: 2 findings, 0 critical; none marked fixed.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Venus Protocol’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings2

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High100
Medium000
Low100
HighCentralization Related RisksOpen

The centralization risks indicated here are only related to those within the scope of the audit. CertiK has not audited the whole `venus-protocol` repository before and we recommend users to carefully review the handling of privileged roles throughout the codebase. ### Comptroller The role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` can grant addresses the privilege to call the following functions: - `setForcedLiquidation()` Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` or these privileged functions may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - Enable force liquidation on any market, allowing all borrows to be liquidated. This will cause users who have healthy borrows to still be liquidated and subject them to the liquidation fee. If this is executed unexpectedly, users may not have adequate time to repay their borrows in order to avoid being subject to the liquidation fees.

LowPotential Rate Manipulation If Force Liquidated MOpen

Tokens should be provided and locked in every market during normal operating conditions, to avoid the total supply becoming low enough that the rate can be significantly manipulated. For example this was the cause of the Hundred Finance Exploit: [https://decrypt.co/136918/hacker-exploits-hundred-finance-protocol-in-7-4-million-heist/](https://decrypt.co/136918/hacker-exploits-hundred-finance-protocol-in-7-4-million-heist/). However, when forced liquidations are enabled for markets, it is likely that the total supply of the markets will drop and the project may wish to redeem their locked tokens. If all operations are frozen for the market, then redeeming the locked tokens can be executed safely. However, if in the future the market is to be enabled and supported again, it must be ensured that tokens are supplied and locked in the market in the same transaction that operations are unfrozen.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (2)

  • contracts/Comptroller/Comptroller.sol
  • contracts/Comptroller/ComptrollerStorage.sol

Part of Venus Protocol’s security record

Venus Protocol
Audits67 audits by 7 firmsLast audit Sep 2025, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 67 reports, 4 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
IncidentIncident 12 May 2022Source: De.Fi incident database.
Open Venus Protocol’s security record

Security firm

CertiK

1,045 projects reviewed · 1,376 reports · latest May 2025

See CertiK’s audits

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us