Deeplink

In the contract `MultiSigTimeLock`, the role `_signer` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_signer` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and remove a signer from the signers list, create a new proposal with execution delay, approve a proposal, revoke approval for a proposal, update required approval count, add a new signer, authorize upgrade for a new implementation address, and update the minimum delay seconds.  ---- In the contract `Token`, the role `timeLock` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_multisigtimelockcontract` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and disable lock permanently, set the mint amount for a minter, remove lock transfer admin status, update lock duration for a wallet address, add transfer lock admin address, and enable lock permanently.  In the contract `Token`, the role `lockTransferAdmins` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `lockTransferAdmins` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer and lock tokens for a specified duration.  In the contract `Token`, the role `minter` has authority over the function below. Any compromise to the `minter` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint tokens to any accounts. - `mint()`

In the contracts `Token` and `MultiSigTimeLock`, the role `canUpgradeAddress` of the `Token` contract and the role `canUpgradeAddress` of the `MultiSigTimeLock` contract have the authority to update the implementation contract behind the `Token` and `MultiSigTimeLock` contracts. Any compromise to these accounts may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the implementation contract, which is pointed by proxy, and therefore execute potential malicious functionality in the implementation contract.

All of the **DLC** tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally-owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

The `transferAndLock` function adds a lock entry for each user, ensuring that the total number of entries does not exceed 100 to avoid potential DoS on gas: ```solidity require(infos.length < 100, "Too many lock entries"); // Limit lock entries ``` However, assigning this role to non-admin users could pose a risk of a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack on the lock mechanism that occupies all entries with redundant entries if a user becomes malicious.

The `Token` contract inherits from `ERC20BurnableUpgradeable`, allowing users to burn tokens through the `burn` and `burnFrom` functions. As a result of token burning, the actual token supply can decrease below the `maxSupply`. Similarly, the user may burn extra tokens compared with the available amount at the time.