1inch Fusion

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed 1inch Network (1inch Fusion) on 24 Mar 2025: 5 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
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Findings7

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium021
Low020

Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.

InformationalLack of Monotonicity Enforcement in Dutch Auction Rate BumpsAcknowledged

The protocol documentation specifies that the auction operates on a Dutch auction model, where the price is expected to decline over time. However, in the `calculate_rate_bump()` function in `fusion-swap/src/dutch_auction.rs`, there is no check to ensure that the rate bumps specified by the user in `points_and_time_deltas` are in a strictly declining order. This omission allows a user to supply rate bump values that could be non-monotonic (i.e., a subsequent bump could be higher than a previous one), which contradicts the intended Dutch auction behavior and the protocol documentation.

InformationalMissing Input ValidationAcknowledged

The fusion-swap program currently allows makers to supply fee parameters via the `ReducedFeeConfig` and rate bump values in the Dutch auction data without performing explicit bound checks. Unlike the surplus fee—which is validated to be less than `BASE_1E2`—there is no on-chain validation to ensure that: - The protocol fee and integrator fee values (or their sum) are within a reasonable range (e.g., less than or equal to `BASE_1E5`). Without this check, makers could specify arbitrarily high fees, potentially leading to unintended pricing behavior and potential underflow when substracting the fees from the `dst_amount`. - The rate bumps provided in the Dutch auction parameters are within an acceptable range relative to `BASE_1E5`. This extra validation would help prevent overflow in the `calculate_rate_bump()` function and ensure that the auction price adjustment behaves as intended.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

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Repository and files the report names (1)

  • solana-fusion/programs/fusion-swap/**

Part of 1inch Network’s security record

1inch Network
Audits53 audits by 13 firmsLast audit Jul 2026, by Hexens.
Critical findings2 criticals acknowledged, not fixedReported in “1inch Liquidity Protocol” by Consensys, Dec 2020. The team acknowledged both.
IncidentIncident 6 Mar 2025Source: De.Fi incident database.
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Quantstamp

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