PHI

CertiKFiles named in the report

CertiK reviewed Philand (PHI) on 16 Nov 2022: 17 findings, 0 critical; 7 marked fixed, 10 open.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Philand’s security record

Report hosted on skynet.certik.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings17

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High900
Medium002
Low105
HighCentralization Risks in BaseObject.solOpen

In the contract `BaseObject` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and collect royalties from tokens they did not create as well receive funds that should be directed to the treasury address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/696d7fa2ed42483a95326c709041e30f/diagrams/centralization_BaseObject-BaseObject-_owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in BasePlate.solOpen

In the contract `BasePlate` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce ownership of the contract. This will prevent the creation of `BasePlates tokens` and hence keep anyone from purchasing a `BasePlate`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/696d7fa2ed42483a95326c709041e30f/diagrams/centralization_BasePlate-BasePlate-_owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in FreeObject.solOpen

In the contract `FreeObject` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce ownership which prevents the creation of free objects to be distributed to buyers. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/696d7fa2ed42483a95326c709041e30f/diagrams/centralization_FreeObject-FreeObject-_owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in PhiClaim.solOpen

In the contract `PhiClaim` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the admin signer so that coupons won't verify. This causes any call to `claimQuestObject()` to fail. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/696d7fa2ed42483a95326c709041e30f/diagrams/centralization_PhiClaim-PhiClaim-_owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in PhiMap.solOpen

In the contract `PhiMap` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, change the owner of any land and write objects to land by calling the function `writeObjectToLand()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/696d7fa2ed42483a95326c709041e30f/diagrams/centralization_PhiMap-PhiMap-_owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in PremiumObject.solOpen

In the contract `PremiumObject` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce ownership of the contract. This will prevent the creation of `Premium tokens` and hence keep anyone from purchasing a `Premium object`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/696d7fa2ed42483a95326c709041e30f/diagrams/centralization_PremiumObject-PremiumObject-_owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in QuestObject.solOpen

In the contract `QuestObject` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and create an arbitrary amount of quest objects to be claimed via the function `createObject()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/696d7fa2ed42483a95326c709041e30f/diagrams/centralization_QuestObject-QuestObject-_owner.svg)

HighCentralization Risks in Registry.solOpen

In the contract `Registry` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the Phi Map address and the Phi land owner. The owner may also change the admin signer name which will prevent any coupon from verifying. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/696d7fa2ed42483a95326c709041e30f/diagrams/centralization_Registry-Registry-_owner.svg)

HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeOpen

`PhiClaim`, `PhiMap`, and `Registry` are upgradeable contracts, the owner can upgrade the contracts without the community's consent. If an attacker compromises the account, they can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.

LowUser-Defined GettersOpen

The linked functions are equivalent to the compiler-generated getter functions for the respective variables.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (11)

  • contracts/object/FreeObject.sol
  • contracts/object/PremiumObject.sol
  • contracts/Registry.sol
  • contracts/object/WallPaper.sol
  • contracts/utils/MultiOwner.sol
  • contracts/utils/BaseObject.sol
  • contracts/object/QuestObject.sol
  • contracts/object/BasePlate.sol
  • contracts/PhiClaim.sol
  • contracts/PhiMap.sol
  • contracts/PhiShop.sol

Part of Philand’s security record

Philand
Audits1 audit by 1 firmLast audit Nov 2022, by CertiK.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsIn 1 report.
Open Philand’s security record

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