Philand has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 16 Nov 2022; no critical findings reported.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
10 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 9 high, 1 low (all open).
Centralization Risks in BaseObject.sol
PHI · CertiK · 16 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in BasePlate.sol
PHI · CertiK · 16 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in FreeObject.sol
PHI · CertiK · 16 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in PhiClaim.sol
PHI · CertiK · 16 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in PhiMap.sol
PHI · CertiK · 16 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in PremiumObject.sol
PHI · CertiK · 16 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in QuestObject.sol
PHI · CertiK · 16 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Centralization Risks in Registry.sol
PHI · CertiK · 16 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Centralized Control of Contract Upgrade
PHI · CertiK · 16 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
User-Defined Getters
PHI · CertiK · 16 Nov 2022 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PHI | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 9 high · 2 medium · 6 low 7 fixed · 10 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Low | 1 | 0 | 5 |
In the contract `BaseObject` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and collect royalties from tokens they did not create as well receive funds that should be directed to the treasury address. 
Open the reportIn the contract `BasePlate` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce ownership of the contract. This will prevent the creation of `BasePlates tokens` and hence keep anyone from purchasing a `BasePlate`. 
Open the reportIn the contract `FreeObject` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce ownership which prevents the creation of free objects to be distributed to buyers. 
Open the reportIn the contract `PhiClaim` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the admin signer so that coupons won't verify. This causes any call to `claimQuestObject()` to fail. 
Open the reportIn the contract `PhiMap` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, change the owner of any land and write objects to land by calling the function `writeObjectToLand()`. 
Open the reportIn the contract `PremiumObject` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce ownership of the contract. This will prevent the creation of `Premium tokens` and hence keep anyone from purchasing a `Premium object`. 
Open the reportIn the contract `QuestObject` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and create an arbitrary amount of quest objects to be claimed via the function `createObject()`. 
Open the reportIn the contract `Registry` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the Phi Map address and the Phi land owner. The owner may also change the admin signer name which will prevent any coupon from verifying. 
Open the report`PhiClaim`, `PhiMap`, and `Registry` are upgradeable contracts, the owner can upgrade the contracts without the community's consent. If an attacker compromises the account, they can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.
Open the reportThe linked functions are equivalent to the compiler-generated getter functions for the respective variables.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Philand, dated 16 Nov 2022. The latest is by CertiK (“PHI”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Philand.
10 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 9 high, 1 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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