Cube3

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Resonance Security reviewed Cube3 on 20 Oct 2023: 4 findings, 0 critical; all marked fixed.

No open critical findings
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Report stored on IPFS. Content hash QmbyBNEKndswLU5HWUMosJWQRwF2nHXyo1Qh5Zj2T4K3JH

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Findings8

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High001
Medium002
Low001

Marked Info by the firm. Not counted as findings.

InfoSignature Replay Attacks Possible When shouldTrackNonce Is FalseAcknowledged

The function validateSignature() in the signature module is used for validating the signature present in the cube3SecurePayload. This signature is generated with multiple input parameters, while bearing in mind two important variables. One of them is a boolean value identifying whether nonce tracking is enabled or not, and another is the respective nonce if the tracking is indeed enabled.The fact that it is possible for a customer to choose whether they enable nonce tracking or not, a possibility to be vulnerable to signature replay attacks is presented. When nonce tracking is disabled, signatures can be replayed.For example, if a customer protected function implements logic for a user to receive 10 tokens, but nonce tracking was forgetfully left disabled, the same user can use the same signature and retrieve 10 more tokens an infinite number of times.

InfoInstalling Non-Cube3 Module PossibleFixed

The function installModule() does not validate if the module to be installed identified by the input parameter moduleAddress is in fact a Cube3Module. As per the implementation of this function, the module is only required to implement the functions moduleVersion() and moduleId(). This effectively means that when installing a new module via installModule() it is not necessary for the module to inherit from the contract Cube3Module, therefore, it doesn't need to implement the function deprecate(). A vulnerable module that was previously installed on the router will never be able to be deprecated by the Cube3 administrator.

InfoMissing Input Validation on moduleVersionFixed

According to the documentation and code commenting, the minimum valid length for a module version is 9 bytes. However, the check on the constructor of the Cube3Module contract only allows modules to be deployed with a version of 10 bytes or more.Additionally, no validation is being made on the module version in regards to the specification of its format.

InfoSignature Module Unusable When Contract Is Caller of IntegrationFixed

Inside the function validateSignature(), the first input validation is made between the variables integrationMsgSender and tx.origin, requiring both variables to be the same address. The integrationMsgSender variable is set all the way back in the Cube3Protected contract as the caller of the integration contract. The tx.origin variable always contains the address of the transaction's initiator EOA account.As per the implemented logic, a contract can never call a protected function in the integration contract since the address of the caller contract will never be an EOA address. This hinders many legitimate use cases and affects blockchain and smart contract interoperability.

Contracts in scope

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Part of Cube3’s security record

Cube3
Audits4 audits by 1 firmLast audit Aug 2024, by Resonance Security.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross 4 reports.
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Security firm

Resonance Security

27 projects reviewed · 57 reports · latest Dec 2025

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