Blob DAO audit reports

Blob DAO has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 26 Sep 2023; no critical findings reported.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm6

Statuses are the security firms’ own

6 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 3 medium, 1 low (5 open, 1 acknowledged).

High
2
Medium
3
Low
1
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    BlobToken-Audit · CertiK · 26 Sep 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    BlobToken-Audit · CertiK · 26 Sep 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Lack a Sanity Check for `tokenPath`

    BlobToken-Audit · CertiK · 26 Sep 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Potential Sandwich Attacks

    BlobToken-Audit · CertiK · 26 Sep 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Potential Transfer Revert

    BlobToken-Audit · CertiK · 26 Sep 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Acknowledged

    Third-Party Dependency Usage

    BlobToken-Audit · CertiK · 26 Sep 2023 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
BlobToken-AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openFindings: 3 high · 4 medium · 5 low
6 fixed · 1 acknowledged · 5 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings12

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High201
Medium301
Low014
HighCentralization Related RisksBlobToken-Audit · CertiK · 26 Sep 2023Open

In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce ownership and transfer ownership to any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-471a-1260ce40-a747-67ba358671ba/diagrams/centralization_Ownable-Ownable-_owner.svg) In the contract `ERC20Mod` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove presale addresses, set deploy, and distribute tax. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-471a-1260ce40-a747-67ba358671ba/diagrams/centralization_ERC20Mod-ERC20Mod-_owner.svg) In the contract `Taxable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove DEX addresses, add/update/remove Tax addresses, update threshold and tax, set priceFeed, reward and router addresses, add/remove tax exempts addresses ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-471a-1260ce40-a747-67ba358671ba/diagrams/centralization_Taxable-Taxable-_owner.svg) In the contract `Feeding` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set router and reward addresses, set the reward threshold for the feed pool, set the growth rate increase for reward calculation, set the base growth rate for reward calculation, set the token path to blob for a feed token, add/remove feed token and withdraw funds from the contract to an external account. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-471a-a09eaf60-bd97-758bfd1b60aa/diagrams/centralization_Feeding-Feeding-_owner.svg)

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HighInitial Token DistributionBlobToken-Audit · CertiK · 26 Sep 2023Open

`10_000_000_000 * 10 ** 18` of the `Blob` tokens are sent to the contract deployer or one or several externally owned account (EOA) addresses. This is a centralization risk because the deployer or the owner(s) of the EOAs can distribute tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community. Any compromise to these addresses may allow a hacker to steal and sell tokens on the market, resulting in severe damage to the project.

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MediumLack a Sanity Check for `tokenPath`BlobToken-Audit · CertiK · 26 Sep 2023Open

The `feed()` function lacks a sanity check for both `_tokenIn` and `WETH` to ensure their token paths are accurately configured. In the event of an incorrectly set token path, the `_swap()` function will trigger a reversion, preventing users from successfully executing the feeding action.

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MediumPotential Sandwich AttacksBlobToken-Audit · CertiK · 26 Sep 2023Open

A sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction is attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (after the transaction is attacked) a transaction to sell the asset. The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large: - `IUniswapV2Router02(routerAddress).swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens`

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MediumPotential Transfer RevertBlobToken-Audit · CertiK · 26 Sep 2023Open

Within the `_transfer()` function, when `deploymentSet` is set to true, and both `currentTaxAmount` and the outgoing amount surpass the specified `threshold`, tax distribution occurs. Nevertheless, the successful execution of the `_distributeTax()` function necessitates a cumulative tax percentage of 100. Any inaccuracies in configuring tax receivers and percentages will result in a reversion of the `_transfer()` function, thereby preventing users from engaging in token transactions, whether buying or selling.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

The reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.

Blob DAO: questions

Is Blob DAO audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Blob DAO, dated 26 Sep 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“BlobToken-Audit”).

Who audited Blob DAO?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Blob DAO.

Are there open findings in Blob DAO’s audits?

6 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 3 medium, 1 low (5 open, 1 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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