Brightpool audit reports

Arbitrum, Ethereumbrightpool.financeX

Brightpool has 2 public audit reports from Zokyo and CertiK; the latest is Zokyo, 9 Feb 2024; 3 critical findings, all marked fixed by the firms.

Critical findings
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Across the 2 reports, 3 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it. See the findings
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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm2

Statuses are the security firms’ own

2 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 1 medium (all open).

High
1
Medium
1
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    Darkpool - private sale · CertiK · 22 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

  • Medium Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    Darkpool - private sale · CertiK · 22 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

Audits2

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Brightpool Finance Smart Contracts ReviewSecurity firm: ZokyoDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 1 high · 1 low
2 fixed
IPFS ↗
Darkpool - private saleSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listed3 critical findings, fixedFindings: 3 critical · 2 high · 9 medium · 34 low
46 fixed · 2 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings51

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical003
High102
Medium108
Low0035
HighCentralization Related RisksDarkpool - private sale · CertiK · 22 Jun 2023Open

The following represents the current state of the protocol as of the final commit referenced by this audit. Any changes made because of the audit are included to best convey the current status of the protocol. Please also see the alleviations section for multi-sig information as well. ### BRI.sol In the contract `BRI` the role `_adminorowner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_adminorowner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the `oracle` address which has the privileged functions outlined below. It should be noted that this has also uses the `BrightPoolWarden` subjecting this change to a 24 hour time-lock and requiring both the `admin` and `owner` to execute this function. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/242e14b7e66e4af09499088034b5300f/diagrams/centralization_BRI-BRI-_adminorowner.svg) In the contract `BRI` the role `_admin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and call `killTransfers()` which can prevent transfers for up to 24 hours. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/f2b3473480944c939668718f4039553e/diagrams/centralization_BRI-BRI-_admin.svg) In the contract `BRI` the role `_ledger` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_ledger` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint or burn `BRI` for any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/f2b3473480944c939668718f4039553e/diagrams/centralization_BRI-BRI-_ledger.svg) In the contract `BRI` the role `_oracle` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_oracle` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint or burn `BRI` for any address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/f2b3473480944c939668718f4039553e/diagrams/centralization_BRI-BRI-_oracle.svg) --- ### BRINFT.sol In the contract `BRINFT` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - set the sale contract, which can do the following priviledged actions below. However, the function can only be called once; - mint tokens to any address, but this can only be called once; ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/b54603c7f2d34c689a06d509a81b59db/diagrams/centralization_BRINFT-BRINFT-_owner.svg) In the contract `BRINFT` the role `_adminorowner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_admin` or `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the price and token URI for a given tokenID, however, this function can only be called once. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/f2b3473480944c939668718f4039553e/diagrams/centralization_BRINFT-BRINFT-_adminorowner.svg) In the contract `BRINFT` the role `_salecontract` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_salecontract` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and burn or mint tokens. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/f2b3473480944c939668718f4039553e/diagrams/centralization_BRINFT-BRINFT-_salecontract.svg) --- ### IBrightPoolLedger In the contract `IBrightPoolLedger` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set the manager contract through the `BrightPoolWarden` giving it access to the privileges outlined in `BrightPoolLedger`. As it goes through the `BrightPoolWarden` this is subject to a 24 hour time-lock. This contract is inherited by `BrightPoolLedger`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/242e14b7e66e4af09499088034b5300f/diagrams/centralization_IBrightPoolLedger-IBrightPoolLedger-_owner.svg) --- ### BrightPoolLedger.sol In the contract `BrightPoolLedger` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and do the following: - add a malicious exchange, however this is executed via `BrightPoolWarder` and thus is subjected to a 24 hour time-lock; - remove an exchange, which can be used to ensure a certain exchange is used whose price could be manipulated. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/242e14b7e66e4af09499088034b5300f/diagrams/centralization_BrightPoolLedger-BrightPoolLedger-_owner.svg) In the contract `BrightPoolLedger` the role `_manager` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_manager` account may allow the hacker to

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MediumInitial Token DistributionDarkpool - private sale · CertiK · 22 Jun 2023Open

All `Bri` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute `Bri` tokens without the consensus of the community.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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The repositories and files the reports name

Brightpool: questions

Is Brightpool audited?

Trustblock holds 2 public audit reports for Brightpool, dated 22 Jun 2023 to 9 Feb 2024. The latest is by Zokyo (“Brightpool Finance Smart Contracts Review”).

Who audited Brightpool?

2 security firms wrote the reports Trustblock holds for Brightpool: Zokyo and CertiK.

Are there open findings in Brightpool’s audits?

2 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 1 high, 1 medium (all open). Of 3 critical findings: all marked fixed by the firms. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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