As of 19 Nov 2026, Cube3 has 4 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by Resonance Security, dated 14 Aug 2024. Those reports list no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cube3 | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: Repository, no commit named | None open | IPFS ↗ |
| Cube3 Protocol RASP v2 | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | GitHub ↗ |
| Cube3 Protocol RASP | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | GitHub ↗ |
| Cube3 | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: Repository, no commit named | None open | IPFS ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Low | 0 | 2 | 4 |
Marked Info by the firms. Not counted as findings.
In several places across the codebase, contracts reference addresses of other contracts. A validation is performed that simply verifies whether these addresses are equal to the zero-address. This assures calling only an existing address in the blockchain, however, it does not ensures that this address is able to properly receive the call. Such validation is performed via ERC165's supportsInterface() function which makes sure that a given address implements an expected interface. Additionally, such a validation indirectly asserts that the the given address is a not a zero-address.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportOpenZeppelin implements several standards used all across blockchain development, especially in Solidity and the Ethereum Virtual Machine. These standards primary goal is to unify and normalize development patterns so that the entire blockchain may be more understandable and readily usable.The Cube3 smart contracts implement source code that mimics or is very similar to components already implemented by OpenZepellin, and could therefore, be switched with the more the standard well-known approach. Such source code is included in:RouterStorage.sol contract pausability features, can be substituted with OpenZeppellin's implementation of PausableUpgradeable.It should be noted that the usage of bigger libraries does not constitute an overuse of gas, since only the functions that are used are included on the bytecode of the smart contract.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe function validateSignature() in the signature module is used for validating the signature present in the cube3SecurePayload. This signature is generated with multiple input parameters, while bearing in mind two important variables. One of them is a boolean value identifying whether nonce tracking is enabled or not, and another is the respective nonce if the tracking is indeed enabled.The fact that it is possible for a customer to choose whether they enable nonce tracking or not, a possibility to be vulnerable to signature replay attacks is presented. When nonce tracking is disabled, signatures can be replayed.For example, if a customer protected function implements logic for a user to receive 10 tokens, but nonce tracking was forgetfully left disabled, the same user can use the same signature and retrieve 10 more tokens an infinite number of times.
Open the reportFloating pragmas is a feature of Solidity that allows developers to specify a range of compiler versions that can be used to compile the smart contract code. For security purposes specifically, the usage of floating pragmas is discouraged and not recommended. Contracts should be compiled and deployed with a strict pragma, the one which was thoroughly tested the most by developers. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using too old or too recent compiler versions that might introduce security issues that impact the contract negatively.It should be noted however that, pragma statements can be allowed to float when a contract is intended for consumption by other developers, as in the case with contracts in a library or EthPM package.The smart contracts of Cube3's core protocol make use of floating pragmas. These are not intended for use as libraries for other developers and, as such, should be locked of their pragma.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe ProtocolManagement contract defines an installModule() function that saves new module's address into the storage. It was observed that it performs a zero-address check that is then followed by ERC165's supportsInterface() verification. Because the ERC165 standard is used, the zero-address check is redundant as the supportsInterface() function will fail if called on the zero-address. Effectively, the zero-address check is performed twice which incurs a higher gas costs.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe function installModule() does not validate if the module to be installed identified by the input parameter moduleAddress is in fact a Cube3Module. As per the implementation of this function, the module is only required to implement the functions moduleVersion() and moduleId(). This effectively means that when installing a new module via installModule() it is not necessary for the module to inherit from the contract Cube3Module, therefore, it doesn't need to implement the function deprecate(). A vulnerable module that was previously installed on the router will never be able to be deprecated by the Cube3 administrator.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportAccording to the documentation and code commenting, the minimum valid length for a module version is 9 bytes. However, the check on the constructor of the Cube3Module contract only allows modules to be deployed with a version of 10 bytes or more.Additionally, no validation is being made on the module version in regards to the specification of its format.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportInside the function validateSignature(), the first input validation is made between the variables integrationMsgSender and tx.origin, requiring both variables to be the same address. The integrationMsgSender variable is set all the way back in the Cube3Protected contract as the caller of the integration contract. The tx.origin variable always contains the address of the transaction's initiator EOA account.As per the implemented logic, a contract can never call a protected function in the integration contract since the address of the caller contract will never be an EOA address. This hinders many legitimate use cases and affects blockchain and smart contract interoperability.
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