Cyber security record
As of 14 Oct 2026, Cyber has 7 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by HashEx, dated 20 Aug 2024. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Statuses are the security firms’ own. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits7
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cyber | Security firm: HashEx | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · hashex.org |
| Cyberconnect - staking pool | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| CyberConnect - cybergraph | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| CyberConnect - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Cyberconnect - cybervesting | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| CyberConnect - CyberToken | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Not recorded. See the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| CyberConnect | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
Findings45
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 5 | 4 | 0 |
| Medium | 1 | 0 | 6 |
| Low | 23 | 0 | 6 |
HighCentralization Risks in CyberStakingPool.solCyberconnect - staking pool · CertiK · 9 Apr 2024Acknowledged
In the contract `CyberStakingPool` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.  - `setBridgeWhitelist(address bridgeAddress, bool isWhitelisted)`: Sets the whitelisting status of a bridge address, allowing or disallowing it for bridging operations. Privileged role: `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the project. In the contract `CyberStakingPool` the role `_OPERATOR_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.  - `setAssetWhitelist(address asset, bool isWhitelisted)`: Sets the whitelisting status of an asset, allowing or disallowing it for deposit and withdrawal. Privileged role: `_OPERATOR_ROLE`. - `pause()`: Pauses the deposit functions in the contract to prevent new deposits. This can be used in emergency situations. Privileged role: `_OPERATOR_ROLE`. - `unpause()`: Unpauses the deposit functions in the contract, allowing new deposits after being paused. Privileged role: `_OPERATOR_ROLE`. Any compromise to the `_OPERATOR_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the project.
Open the reportHighCentralization Risks in LaunchTokenPool.solCyberConnect - cybergraph · CertiK · 4 Mar 2024Acknowledged
In the contract `LaunchTokenPool` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.  - `withdraw(address to, uint256 amount)`: Allows the owner to withdraw CYBER tokens from the contract. Accessible only by the owner. - `withdrawERC20(address currency, address to, uint256 amount)`: Allows the owner to withdraw any ERC20 tokens from the contract. Accessible only by the owner. - `pause()`: Allows the owner to pause the contract, which prevents deposits. Accessible only by the owner. - `unpause()`: Allows the owner to unpause the contract, which enables deposits. Accessible only by the owner. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functionalities of the protocol.
Open the reportHighCentralization Risks in CyberVesting.solCyberconnect - cybervesting · CertiK · 15 Aug 2023Acknowledged
In the contract `CyberVesting` the role `_owner` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and call `recoverERC20()` to withdraw ERC20 tokens from `CyberVesting`. 
Open the reportHighCentralized Balance ManipulationCyberConnect - CyberToken · CertiK · 3 Aug 2023Acknowledged
In the contract `CyberToken`, the role `_owner` has the authority to update the token balance of an arbitrary account via `mint` function without sanity restriction. Meanwhile, the role `_owner` has the authority over the following functions: * `renounceOwnership()` - Give up contract ownership and set owner to address(0) * `transferOwnership()` - Transfer the contract ownership to a new address Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and manipulate users' balances.
Open the reportContracts1
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0x14778860e937f509e651192a90589de711fb88a9 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
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