Dex Finance has 3 public audit reports from Zellic, Hacken and CertiK; the latest is Zellic, 19 May 2025; 1 critical finding, marked fixed by the firm. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
4 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 1 medium, 1 low (1 open, 3 acknowledged).
Excessive GitHub organization permissions
DexFi security assessment · Zellic · 19 May 2025 · Report ↗
Centralization Related Risks
DEX Finance (dexVAULTS & dex ETF) · CertiK · 1 Mar 2023 · Report ↗
Secrets in source code
DexFi security assessment · Zellic · 19 May 2025 · Report ↗
Pull requests merged without code reviews
DexFi security assessment · Zellic · 19 May 2025 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DexFi security assessment | Security firm: Zellic | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | Findings: 1 high · 1 medium · 1 low 3 acknowledged | GitHub ↗ |
| Dex Finance / DEX | Security firm: Hacken | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Arbitrum | None open | Findings: None listed | hacken.io ↗ |
| DEX Finance (dexVAULTS & dex ETF) | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | 1 critical finding, fixed | Findings: 1 critical · 3 high · 1 medium · 12 low 16 fixed · 1 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| High | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 1 | 12 |
In the contract `DexFiLPZapper` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `DexFiTreasury` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `DexFiVault` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `DexFiVaultFactory` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `DexFiVaultProfitStorage` the role `vault` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `vault` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `DexFiFarmOutsidePoolConnector` the role `vault` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `vault` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `DexShareRewardPoolConnector` the role `vault` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `vault` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `PancakeMasterPoolConnector` the role `vault` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `vault` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `DexFiETF` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `DexFiETFZapper` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `OwnerSourceManagement` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.  In the contract `DexFiVaultHarvester` the role `keeper` has authority over the function `harvest()`, which harvests rewards and pays the `keeper` for the service. Any compromise to the `keeper` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `VaultHarvesterDebtManagement` the role `harvester` has authority over the function `increaseHarvesterDebt()`, which increases the amount that needs to be paid to the `keeper` for harvesting. Any compromise to the `harvester` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In commit [64b0850cccc1cfc1464064d63db9d235baf5f1e1](https://github.com/dexfinance-com/vaults-pro/commit/64b0850cccc1cfc1464064d63db9d235baf5f1e1), the role `_owner` is added to the contract `DexFiVaultZapper`. The role `_owner` has authority over the functions listed below: - `addTokensWhitelis
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xda06…168a0xda064d44871ba31dae33a65b3e23b37e44e9168a | Chain: Arbitrum | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 3 public audit reports for Dex Finance, dated 1 Mar 2023 to 19 May 2025. The latest is by Zellic (“DexFi security assessment”).
3 security firms wrote the reports Trustblock holds for Dex Finance: Zellic, Hacken and CertiK.
4 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high, 1 medium, 1 low (1 open, 3 acknowledged). Of 1 critical finding: marked fixed by the firm. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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