ducatus.com has 1 public audit report from QuillAudits; dated 25 Apr 2024; no critical findings reported.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
13 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 3 medium, 7 low (5 open, 8 acknowledged).
Sensitive Wallet Information Disclosed in Memory
Ducatus Wallet - Pentest · CertiK · 25 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Fingerprint Bypass
Ducatus Wallet · QuillAudits · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Information Disclosure
Ducatus Wallet · QuillAudits · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Unsafe Dependencies
Ducatus Wallet - Pentest · CertiK · 25 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Admin Panel Exposed
Ducatus Wallet · QuillAudits · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Weak Cryptography
Ducatus Wallet · QuillAudits · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Lack of SSL Pinning
Ducatus Wallet - Pentest · CertiK · 25 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Logging of Sensitive Information
Ducatus Wallet - Pentest · CertiK · 25 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Missing Jailbreak detection
Ducatus Wallet - Pentest · CertiK · 25 Apr 2024 · Report ↗
Clickjacking
Ducatus Wallet · QuillAudits · 12 Dec 2023 · Report ↗
Newest first
1 other security report listed, not counted
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ducatus Wallet - Pentest Penetration test of off-chain systemsNot counted as an audit report | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | Findings: 1 high · 1 medium · 3 low 5 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| Ducatus Wallet | Security firm: QuillAudits | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | Findings: 2 high · 3 medium · 4 low 1 fixed · 8 acknowledged | quillaudits.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Low | 3 | 4 | 0 |
The wallet by default stores the private key and the mnemonics for each wallet in plain text. The mnemonics for the backed up wallets are also available in memory in plain text.   The option to encrypt the private key using a password is provided, but even after encrypting with the password, the password, the mnemonic and the private key can be found in the memory of the application.   After reviewing the code, the component which handles the private key seems to store the private key in the class memory. This leads to the private key being globally available. The private key is only set to null when it is encrypted, upon decryption, the global variable `xPrivKey` is set to the plain text private key. 
Open the reportSome of the dependencies used on the project are unmaintained and have high-risk security vulnerabilities. The usage of [sjcl](https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl), which has not been updated for over 5 years, may expose the application to timing attacks. (https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl/issues/438) The code available does not seem to make use of Elliptic Curve cryptography but the timing attacks may occur in other functions of the library as well. It is recommended to use the standard Crypto library for Node.js (https://nodejs.org/api/crypto.html) to perform cryptographic operations, as this provides protection against timing attacks. It was also observed that the project uses outdated dependencies with known vulnerabilities. Below is a list: - lodash 4.17.20 - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-23337 - loader-utils 1.4.0 - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-37601 - ajv 6.12.0 - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-15366 - async 2.6.3 - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-43138 - semver 6.3.0 - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-25883
Open the reportCertificate pinning is the process of associating the backend server with a particular X.509 certificate or public key instead of accepting any certificate signed by a trusted certificate authority. After storing ("pinning") the server certificate or public key, the mobile app will subsequently connect to the known server only. Withdrawing trust from external certificate authorities reduces the attack surface (after all, there are many cases of certificate authorities that have been compromised or tricked into issuing certificates to impostors). The certificate can be pinned and hardcoded into the app or retrieved at the time the app first connects to the backend. In the latter case, the certificate is associated with ("pinned" to) the host when the host is seen for the first time. This alternative is less secure because attackers intercepting the initial connection can inject their own certificates.
Open the reportThe application's `signFreeze` in `deposit.effects.ts` function is currently configured to log out the user's private WIF key in plain text. This logging statement was found within the function's implementation, posing a security risk regarding confidential data handling and storage. It is not clear if this log is also being saved on the filesystem. ```typescript=28 const privateWifKey = (await dispatch<any>( getWifPrivKey(wallet, addressPath ? address?.path! : data.private_path), )) as any; dispatch(LogActions.info('[privateWifKey]:', privateWifKey)); ```
Open the reportJailbreak detection mechanisms are added to reverse engineering defense to make running the app on a jailbroken device more difficult. This blocks some of the tools and techniques reverse engineers like to use. Like most other types of defense, jailbreak detection is not very effective by itself, but scattering checks throughout the app's source code can improve the effectiveness of the overall anti-tampering scheme. It was observed that the iOS application does not adequately detect if the device is jailbroken. As a result, the data which is stored via the iOS application can be exposed when the device that is jailbroken.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for ducatus.com, dated 25 Apr 2024. The latest is by CertiK (“Ducatus Wallet - Pentest”).
QuillAudits wrote the report Trustblock holds for ducatus.com.
13 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 3 medium, 7 low (5 open, 8 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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