As of 3 Nov 2026, MESSIER has 4 audit reports by 3 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by HashEx, dated 5 Aug 2023. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 11 deployed contracts on 1 chain.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Messier | Security firm: HashEx | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · hashex.org |
| Messier - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 2 addresses on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · skynet.certik.com |
| Virgo | Security firm: SolidProof | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · IPFS |
| Messier | Security firm: SolidProof | Date: | Scope: 8 addresses on Ethereum | No open critical findings | Open · IPFS |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| Low | 16 | 2 | 18 |
In the contract `Dao` the role `ORACLE` in the address [0xe0cf9c69894e2cca7221a5d1db2f867ece64b08c](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe0cf9c69894e2cca7221a5d1db2f867ece64b08c) has authority over the functions below. - function `CloseProposal`: to change a proposal's state to `FAILED`. - function `OracleNext`: to validate the quantity of affirmative and negative votes, as well as the number of singers, associated with a proposal before transitioning to the voting phases. Upon the successful completion of these evaluations, the state of the proposal would be modified to initiate the voting stages. - function `FullCycleToExecution`: to execute a cycle, calculate and process the rewards. In the contract `Dao` the role `ORACLE` in the commit [be0fb877ce73207ea4906a438b4390429ef5c953](https://github.com/MessierM87/VIRGO_SolidityContracts/tree/be0fb877ce73207ea4906a438b4390429ef5c953/contracts) has authority over the functions below. - function `OracleNext`: to execute a proposal if the proposal's state is `ready`. - function `FullCycleToExecution`: to execute a cycle, calculate and process the rewards. - function `changeState`: to change the state for a proposal regarding the current state and votes. Any compromise to the `ORACLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `Dao` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority, and set the `_SupernovaBridge` and `_supernova`.  In the contract `Dao` the role `Halo` has authority over the functions below. - function `VoteOnProposal()`: to vote for a proposal. Any compromise to the `Halo` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority. In the contract `Dao` the role `Powehi` has authority over the functions below. - function `createCashOutProposal()`: to create a new cash-out proposal. - function `createDoubleClassicProposal()`: to create a new double down or classical proposal. - function `createStructureProposal()`: to create a new structural proposal. - function `signOnProposal()`: to sign a proposal. Any compromise to the `Powehi` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.
Open the reportThe `execute_Cycle()` and `execute_oneProposal()` functions exhibit significant interactions with the `_SupernovaBridge` contract, which falls outside the scope of this audit. Therefore, we would like the team to provide further elaboration on the design of these functions.
Open the report```solidity=330 uint8 signersNum = uint8(proposal.signers.length); ``` - The type conversion `uint8(proposal.signers.length)` from larger type uint256 to smaller type uint8 may truncate data. --- ```solidity=517 uint8 signersNum = uint8(proposal.signers.length); ``` - The type conversion `uint8(proposal.signers.length)` from larger type uint256 to smaller type uint8 may truncate data.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xe0cf…b08c0xe0cf9c69894e2cca7221a5d1db2f867ece64b08c | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x2b65…4dd40x2b653f343e11ded7daef015aa3034594c3194dd4 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x8012…e8880x80122c6a83c8202ea365233363d3f4837d13e888 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
| 0xeb3c…71220xeb3c2460143c0d1101318faa81546e4b3fa17122 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
| 0xdfe8…81c60xdfe8fb8faa4b4bb9f8d0a8135a1706104b3681c6 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x85c2…22c00x85c2eebab92ef47289f9f05ee29b273e5fa122c0 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
| 0xeb88…c4620xeb8878c6455f2c979e11fab5dc92768afc13c462 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x615a…09190x615a2ba5e4494a2958cd377a97490bbb66d70919 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
| 0xb3b3…6c770xb3b3206203109ff1dff8118386ea90ac834d6c77 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
| 0xb2b0…74080xb2b01b38caa4004b17d880cbc6bd8a092ea17408 | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
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