Metacade audit reports

Base, Ethereummetacade.coGitHub

Metacade has 2 public audit reports from CertiK; the latest is CertiK, 15 Feb 2023; no critical findings reported.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm26

Statuses are the security firms’ own

26 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 4 high, 22 low (all open).

High
4
Low
22
  • High Open

    Centralization Risks in MetacadePresaleV2

    Metacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralization Risks

    Metacade - Audit · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralized Control of Contract Upgrade

    Metacade - Audit · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    Metacade - Audit · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Chainlink's `latestRoundData()` might return stal

    Metacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Check Effect Interaction Pattern Violated

    Metacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Declaration Naming Convention

    Metacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Incorrect Comment

    Metacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Incorrect Current Step Calculation

    Metacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Incorrect Error Message

    Metacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023 · Report ↗

All 26 open and acknowledged findings

Audits2

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Metacade - Audit 2Security firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 1 high · 19 low
20 open
skynet.certik.com ↗
Metacade - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openFindings: 3 high · 11 low
8 fixed · 6 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings34

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High400
Medium000
Low2208
HighCentralization Risks in MetacadePresaleV2Metacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

In the contract `MetacadePresaleV2` the role `owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and [fixme, describe what hacker can do and the impact]. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/187834691c914e3ba4073fd58cdf8634/diagrams/centralization_MetacadePresale.v2-MetacadePresaleV2-owner.svg)

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HighCentralization RisksMetacade - Audit · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022Open

In the contract `Metacade` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and withdraw all ETH and tokens stored in the contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/2610edbfaafa495aa7d03c4c8eeb36b5/diagrams/centralization_Metacade-Metacade-_owner.svg) Furthermore, the role `_owner` has authority over the functions `transferOwnership()` and `renounceOwnership()`. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and change the owner address of the contract. In the contract `Presale` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and pause or unpause the contract, change certain contract settings, and to set the claim start time and sale token address. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/cca813734eb74f8f8c73baf87d42498f/diagrams/centralization_Presale-Presale-_owner.svg)

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HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeMetacade - Audit · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022Open

The `Presale` contract is an upgradeable contract, the owner can upgrade the contract without the community's commitment. If an attacker compromises the account, they can change the implementation of the contract and drain tokens from the contract.

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HighInitial Token DistributionMetacade - Audit · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022Open

All of the `MetaCade` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute `MetaCade` tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

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LowChainlink's `latestRoundData()` might return stalMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

`getLatestPrice()` makes use of the Chainlink's `latestRoundData()` function which does not check whether the return value contains outdated data. This could lead to stale prices according to the Chainlink documentation: https://docs.chain.link/data-feeds/price-feeds/historical-data ```solidity * @dev A timestamp with zero value means the round is not complete and should not be used. ```

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LowCheck Effect Interaction Pattern ViolatedMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

The order of external call/transfer and storage manipulation must follow the check-effect-interaction pattern. A reentrancy attack can occur when the contract creates a function that makes an external call to another untrusted contract before resolving any effects. If the attacker can control the untrusted contract, they can make a recursive call back to the original function, repeating interactions that would have otherwise not run after the external call resolved the effects. ### External call(s) ```solidity=227 _sendValue(payable(owner()), ethAmount); ``` * This function call executes the following external call(s). * In `MetacadePresaleV2._sendValue`, * `(success) = _recipient.call{value: _weiAmount}()` ```solidity=229 if (excess > 0) _sendValue(payable(_msgSender()), excess); ``` ### State variables written after the call(s) ```solidity=233 if (stepAfterPurchase>currentStep) currentStep = stepAfterPurchase; ``` ```solidity=230 totalTokensSold += _amount; _userDeposits[_msgSender()] += _amount * 1e18; ```

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LowDeclaration Naming ConventionMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

One or more declarations do not conform to the [Solidity style guide](https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.7.3/style-guide.html#naming-conventions) with regards to its naming convention. Particularly: - `camelCase`: Should be applied to function names, argument names, local and state variable names, modifiers - `UPPER_CASE`: Should be applied to `constant` variables - `CapWords`: Should be applied to contract names, struct names, event names and enums ```solidity=26 uint256[9] public token_amount; ``` - Variable `token_amount` is not in `camelCase`. --- ```solidity=27 uint256[9] public token_price; ``` - Variable `token_price` is not in `camelCase`. --- ```solidity=28 uint8 constant maxStepIndex = 8; ``` - Constant variable `maxStepIndex` is not in `UPPER_CASE`. --- ```solidity=31 IERC20 public USDTInterface; ``` - Variable `USDTInterface` is not in `camelCase`.

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LowIncorrect CommentMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

The highlighted comment says "...current step `amount`..." when "...current step `index`..." would better represent the `stepIndex` value.

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LowIncorrect Current Step CalculationMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

It is believed that the snippet below should include the case where `token_amount[stepIndex - 1] == totalTokensSold`: ```solidity=359 if (token_amount[stepIndex - 1] < totalTokensSold) break; ```

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LowIncorrect Error MessageMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

The first highlighted `require` statement will throw an error because the user is trying to buy more tokens than the maximum, not because the funds are not enough. The second highlighted `require` statement will throw an error because the user is trying to calculate the price using an excessive amount, not because the amount is insufficient.

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Show 10 more
LowMissing ChecksMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

The following checks are missing: - The length of `_token_amount` should be the same as the length of `_token_price`. - `_endTime` should be greater than `_endTime`.

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LowMissing Emit EventsMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

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LowMissing Zero Address ValidationMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

Addresses should be checked before assignment or external call to make sure they are not zero addresses.

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LowShouldn't `configureClaim()` check `_claimStart >Metacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

Shouldn't `configureClaim()` check if `_claimStart > block.timestamp` and other `startTime` and `endTime` possibilities? Is it possible to set `claimStart` with a lower value than `startTime`? Is it possible to set `claimStart` with a lower value than `endTime`?

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LowShouldn't `userDeposits()` check if `_user` hasClMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

Shouldn't `userDeposits()` check if `_user` has claimed the tokens in `previousPresale` and `betaPresale` contracts to avoid claiming more tokens than the ones bought? Right now this attack scenario does not seem feasible, but the highlighted code could eventually allow it.

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LowThird Party DependencyMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

- The contract `MetacadePresaleV2` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `USDTInterface`. ```solidity=31 IERC20 public USDTInterface; ``` --- - The contract `MetacadePresaleV2` interacts with third party contract with `IAggregator` interface via `aggregatorInterface`. ```solidity=32 IAggregator public aggregatorInterface; ``` --- - The function `MetacadePresaleV2.resqueERC20` interacts with third party contract with `IERC20` interface via `_tokenAddress`. ```solidity=206 function resqueERC20(address _tokenAddress, uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner { ```

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LowTypos In The ContractMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

The word rescue is misspelled along the contract.

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LowUnlocked Compiler VersionMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

The contracts cited have an unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to ambiguity when debugging, as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.

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LowUnnecessary and Missing ChecksMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

The highlighted conditional logic does not seem necessary; in all cases the sale times will be the ones passed as arguments and the event will emit such information. Furthermore, the `changeSaleTimes()` function is not checking whether `_endTime` is greater than `_startTime`.

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LowUnsafe Integer CastMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

The type conversion `uint256(price * 1e10)` from type int256 to type uint256 may flip the value's sign: ```solidity=290 return uint256(price * 1e10); ```

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LowUnused EventMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

`ClaimStartUpdated` is declared in `IMetacadePresaleV2` but never emitted. ```solidity=20 event ClaimStartUpdated( uint256 prevValue, uint256 newValue, uint256 timestamp ); ```

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LowVariable Can Be Declared as ImmutableMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

The variables `USDTInterface` and `aggregatorInterface` assigned in the constructor can be declared as `Immutable` or even as constant. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation, but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. An advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they are not located in storage.

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LowVisibility Specifiers MissingMetacade - Audit 2 · CertiK · 15 Feb 2023Open

The linked variable declarations do not have a visibility specifier explicitly set. Inconsistencies in the default visibility the Solidity compilers impose can cause issues in the functionality of the codebase.

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LowThird Party DependenciesMetacade - Audit · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022Open

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with the third party contract `Aggregator` from Chainlink and the IERC20Upgradeable contract USDT. The scope of the audit treats 3rd party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, 3rd parties can be compromised and this may lead to lost or stolen assets. Additionally, upgrades of 3rd parties can possibly create severe impacts, such as increasing fees of 3rd parties, migrating to new LP pools, etc.

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LowUnchecked ERC-20 `transfer()`/`transferFrom()` CaMetacade - Audit · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022Open

The return value of the `transfer()` and `transferFrom()` calls is not checked. ```solidity=395 IERC20Upgradeable(saleToken).transfer(_msgSender(), amount); ``` --- ```solidity=357 IERC20Upgradeable(_saleToken).transferFrom( _msgSender(), address(this), noOfTokens ); ```

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LowUnsafe Integer CastMetacade - Audit · CertiK · 1 Dec 2022Open

The type conversion `uint256(price)` from type int256 to type uint256 may flip the value's sign: ```solidity=220 return uint256(price); ```

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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Metacade: questions

Is Metacade audited?

Trustblock holds 2 public audit reports for Metacade, dated 1 Dec 2022 to 15 Feb 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“Metacade - Audit 2”).

Who audited Metacade?

CertiK wrote the 2 reports Trustblock holds for Metacade.

Are there open findings in Metacade’s audits?

26 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 4 high, 22 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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