Mossland has 2 public audit reports from CertiK; the latest is CertiK, 15 Aug 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
12 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 5 high, 7 low (all open).
Centralization Related Risks
MossLand Swap - Audit · CertiK · 15 Aug 2023 · Report ↗
Minting Centralization Risk
MossLand Swap - Audit · CertiK · 15 Aug 2023 · Report ↗
Centralization Related Risks
MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗
Initial Token Distribution
MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗
Minting Centralization Risk
MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗
Locked Blockchain Native Tokens
MossLand Swap - Audit · CertiK · 15 Aug 2023 · Report ↗
Arbitrary external calls
MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗
Confusing implementation in function `calculateMi
MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗
Missing Emit Events
MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗
Missing Error Messages
MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MossLand Swap - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: 1 address on Ethereum | None open | Findings: 2 high · 1 low 3 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| MossCoin - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 3 high · 6 low 9 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 7 | 0 | 0 |
In the contract `AccessControl` the role `adminRole` has authority over the following functions: - grantRole() - revokeRole() Any compromise to the `adminRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grant associated role to any account or revoke the role from any account. Note that `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` is the admin role for all roles. --- In the contract `AccessControl` the role `role` has authority over the following function: - renounceRole() Any compromise to the `role` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce corresponding privileges to functions within other contracts. --- In the contract `ERC20Migratable` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint/burn tokens in the contract and pause/unpause the functions `deposit()` and `withdraw()`.  --- In the contract `ERC20Migratable` the role `REGISTRAR_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `REGISTRAR_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and alter the withdrawal allowances of users. 
Open the reportIn the contract, the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has the capability to mint an arbitrary amount of tokens, while the `REGISTRAR_ROLE` permits users to withdraw tokens. If both these roles are compromised, an attacker could get a significant quantity of tokens and sell those tokens to cause the token price to drop.
Open the reportIn the contract `MainToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.  Any compromise to the private key of the `owner` may allow hackers to take advantage of this authority and allow/prevent external user access to the sensitive functionalities controlled by the whenNotPaused modifier. - function `lockAccount()`, to lock any account. Once locked the account cannot access all the functions in the contract. - function `unlockAccount()`, to unlock any account. - function `pause()`, to pause the contract by controlling the `whenNotPaused` status and die or lose the private key. All the users' funds can get stuck in the contract. - function `unpause()`, to unpause the contract. In the contract `LinearMintableToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.  Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify the sensitive state variables in the `linearMint()`. In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.  Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer control of the contract to a `newOwner`.
Open the reportAll MOC tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute MOC tokens without the consensus of the community.
Open the reportIn the contract `MainToken`, the role `owner` has the authority to mint tokens to the `owner` given the `totalSupply` does not exceed the `maxSupply`. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint a huge amount of tokens for themselves. The hacker could sell those tokens and cause the token price to drop. In the contracts `LinearMintableToken`, tokens are gradually minted into the `_owner` EOA address overtime via the `linearMint()` function. This creates a severe centralization risk and can lead to manipulation the tokenomics of the project.
Open the reportThe contract has a payable constructor, making it able to receive native tokens. However, it does not have a function to withdraw the funds, which can lead to permanently locked tokens within the contract. ```solidity=670 constructor(string memory name, string memory symbol) payable ERC20(name, symbol) { ```
Open the reportThe function `approveAndCall` will call unpredictable contracts with arbitrary parameters, which is unsafe.
Open the report`calculateMintAmount` is used for calculating the mint amount of the token. In the function, `pastDays` is calculated as follows: `blockTimestamp.sub(createdTimestamp).div(SECONDS_IN_A_DAY);`, where `blockTimestamp` equals `block.timestamp`. block.timestamp is specified in milliseconds, not seconds, which will cause `pastDays` become inaccurate. Since `intervalPeriodInDays` and `mintAmountPerPeriod` is set by the owner, it is difficult to determine the impact of this issue.
Open the reportThere should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.
Open the reportThe **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller.
Open the reportAccording to the logic in the function `calculateMintAmount()`, the `mintingAmount` will never be zero. ```solidity=15 if ( mintingAmount == 0 ) return; ``` The below state variable is declared but never used. ```solidity=15 uint256 public intervalCount; ```
Open the reportThe linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.
Open the report| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xbee2…4eaf0xbee20b9df360b8442534ed8059f3e5baeeb74eaf | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
Trustblock holds 2 public audit reports for Mossland, dated 30 May 2023 to 15 Aug 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“MossLand Swap - Audit”).
CertiK wrote the 2 reports Trustblock holds for Mossland.
12 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 5 high, 7 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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