Mossland audit reports

Mossland has 2 public audit reports from CertiK; the latest is CertiK, 15 Aug 2023; no critical findings reported. It also holds 1 deployed contract on 1 chain.

Critical findings
No open critical findings
Across 2 reports.
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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm12

Statuses are the security firms’ own

12 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 5 high, 7 low (all open).

High
5
Low
7
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    MossLand Swap - Audit · CertiK · 15 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Minting Centralization Risk

    MossLand Swap - Audit · CertiK · 15 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Minting Centralization Risk

    MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Locked Blockchain Native Tokens

    MossLand Swap - Audit · CertiK · 15 Aug 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Arbitrary external calls

    MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Confusing implementation in function `calculateMi

    MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Missing Emit Events

    MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Open

    Missing Error Messages

    MossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023 · Report ↗

All 12 open and acknowledged findings

Audits2

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
MossLand Swap - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: 1 address on EthereumNone openFindings: 2 high · 1 low
3 open
skynet.certik.com ↗
MossCoin - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 3 high · 6 low
9 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings12

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High500
Medium000
Low700
HighCentralization Related RisksMossLand Swap - Audit · CertiK · 15 Aug 2023Open

In the contract `AccessControl` the role `adminRole` has authority over the following functions: - grantRole() - revokeRole() Any compromise to the `adminRole` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and grant associated role to any account or revoke the role from any account. Note that `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` is the admin role for all roles. --- In the contract `AccessControl` the role `role` has authority over the following function: - renounceRole() Any compromise to the `role` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and renounce corresponding privileges to functions within other contracts. --- In the contract `ERC20Migratable` the role `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint/burn tokens in the contract and pause/unpause the functions `deposit()` and `withdraw()`. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-39fa-94314c10-84c3-9372ae3e8c46/diagrams/centralization_ERC20Migratable-ERC20Migratable-DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.svg) --- In the contract `ERC20Migratable` the role `REGISTRAR_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `REGISTRAR_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and alter the withdrawal allowances of users. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/11ee-39fa-94314c10-84c3-9372ae3e8c46/diagrams/centralization_ERC20Migratable-ERC20Migratable-REGISTRAR_ROLE.svg)

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HighMinting Centralization RiskMossLand Swap - Audit · CertiK · 15 Aug 2023Open

In the contract, the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` has the capability to mint an arbitrary amount of tokens, while the `REGISTRAR_ROLE` permits users to withdraw tokens. If both these roles are compromised, an attacker could get a significant quantity of tokens and sell those tokens to cause the token price to drop.

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HighCentralization Related RisksMossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023Open

In the contract `MainToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/8818378077a14ef9b81d83e9521bc511/diagrams/centralization_MainToken-MainToken-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the private key of the `owner` may allow hackers to take advantage of this authority and allow/prevent external user access to the sensitive functionalities controlled by the whenNotPaused modifier. - function `lockAccount()`, to lock any account. Once locked the account cannot access all the functions in the contract. - function `unlockAccount()`, to unlock any account. - function `pause()`, to pause the contract by controlling the `whenNotPaused` status and die or lose the private key. All the users' funds can get stuck in the contract. - function `unpause()`, to unpause the contract. In the contract `LinearMintableToken` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/8818378077a14ef9b81d83e9521bc511/diagrams/centralization_LinearMintableToken-LinearMintableToken-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and modify the sensitive state variables in the `linearMint()`. In the contract `Ownable` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/8818378077a14ef9b81d83e9521bc511/diagrams/centralization_Ownable-Ownable-_owner.svg) Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer control of the contract to a `newOwner`.

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HighInitial Token DistributionMossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023Open

All MOC tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute MOC tokens without the consensus of the community.

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HighMinting Centralization RiskMossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023Open

In the contract `MainToken`, the role `owner` has the authority to mint tokens to the `owner` given the `totalSupply` does not exceed the `maxSupply`. Any compromise to the `owner` account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and mint a huge amount of tokens for themselves. The hacker could sell those tokens and cause the token price to drop. In the contracts `LinearMintableToken`, tokens are gradually minted into the `_owner` EOA address overtime via the `linearMint()` function. This creates a severe centralization risk and can lead to manipulation the tokenomics of the project.

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LowLocked Blockchain Native TokensMossLand Swap - Audit · CertiK · 15 Aug 2023Open

The contract has a payable constructor, making it able to receive native tokens. However, it does not have a function to withdraw the funds, which can lead to permanently locked tokens within the contract. ```solidity=670 constructor(string memory name, string memory symbol) payable ERC20(name, symbol) { ```

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LowArbitrary external callsMossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023Open

The function `approveAndCall` will call unpredictable contracts with arbitrary parameters, which is unsafe.

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LowConfusing implementation in function `calculateMiMossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023Open

`calculateMintAmount` is used for calculating the mint amount of the token. In the function, `pastDays` is calculated as follows: `blockTimestamp.sub(createdTimestamp).div(SECONDS_IN_A_DAY);`, where `blockTimestamp` equals `block.timestamp`. block.timestamp is specified in milliseconds, not seconds, which will cause `pastDays` become inaccurate. Since `intervalPeriodInDays` and `mintAmountPerPeriod` is set by the owner, it is difficult to determine the impact of this issue.

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LowMissing Emit EventsMossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023Open

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

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LowMissing Error MessagesMossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023Open

The **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller.

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LowRedundant StatementsMossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023Open

According to the logic in the function `calculateMintAmount()`, the `mintingAmount` will never be zero. ```solidity=15 if ( mintingAmount == 0 ) return; ``` The below state variable is declared but never used. ```solidity=15 uint256 public intervalCount; ```

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LowVariables That Could Be Declared as ImmutableMossCoin - Audit · CertiK · 30 May 2023Open

The linked variables assigned in the constructor can be declared as `immutable`. Immutable state variables can be assigned during contract creation but will remain constant throughout the lifetime of a deployed contract. A big advantage of immutable variables is that reading them is significantly cheaper than reading from regular state variables since they will not be stored in storage.

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Contracts1

AddressChainSource code
0xbee20b9df360b8442534ed8059f3e5baeeb74eafChain: EthereumSource code: Verified source

All 1 address and the files the reports name

Mossland: questions

Is Mossland audited?

Trustblock holds 2 public audit reports for Mossland, dated 30 May 2023 to 15 Aug 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“MossLand Swap - Audit”).

Who audited Mossland?

CertiK wrote the 2 reports Trustblock holds for Mossland.

Are there open findings in Mossland’s audits?

12 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 5 high, 7 low (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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