As of 19 Nov 2026, OnRe has 6 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by Quantstamp, dated 22 Sep 2026. Those reports list no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OnRe EVM | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
| OnRe - mmbot | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
| Onre - Re-Audit - 2 | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
| OnRe Solana Diff | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
| OnRe Solana | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
| Nayms - OnRe Offer/Redemption Program Spec | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed | Mitigated |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 3 | 4 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 12 | 6 | 1 |
Marked Undetermined or Informational by the firms. Not counted as findings.
The initialize instruction accepts `onre_program_id` as a caller-supplied parameter. This value is used to validate the `onre_state` account via owner and seeds constraints, and is then stored permanently in `ProgramState`. All subsequent boss and admin authorization checks (`withdraw`, `set_executor`, `set_kill_switch`) derive the `onre_state` PDA from this stored value. However, because `onre_program_id` is a free parameter at initialization, an attacker who observes the program deployment can front-run the legitimate initialization by deploying their own fake program with a state PDA containing the attacker's pubkey as boss. The attacker calls initialize with their fake `onre_program_id`, signs as the boss that matches their fake state, and all Anchor validations pass. The `ProgramState` is then permanently linked to the attacker's program. Since init can only be called once, the legitimate team is locked out. This could lead to full program takeover if initialization is not performed atomically with deployment. The attacker would control the boss role, could set the executor to their own key, disable the kill switch, and withdraw any funds deposited after the hijack. The legitimate boss of the real Onre program would have no authority over the mmbot program.
Open the reportThe `mint_to` instruction allows the boss to mint new ONyc tokens but does not check the `state.is_killed` flag intended to act as a global kill switch. As a result, token minting remains possible even when the protocol is placed into a killed or emergency paused state.
Open the reportWhen calculating how many tokens the user should receive in the `calculate_buy_amount()` function, there is a potential for some small amount of precision to be lost when the sell token has more decimals than the buy token. This is important because the team has outlined their intent to use `USDC` (six decimals) in the protocol, while the `ONe` and `rONe` tokens both have nine decimals. There are two scenarios to be aware of that could cause problems: 1. The user requests to redeem an amount of `rONE` tokens with seven or more decimals. 2. The `USDC`:`ONe` ratio when calling the `take_offer_two()` function causes a normal redemption amount to lose some precision when redeeming a partial amount in `USDC`.
Open the reportThe protocol uses an emergency killswitch that is described to prohibit minting and redeeming tokens while allowing token transfers, quotes, and other view functions. We highlight the following locations where the killswitch may depart from the specification: - `LibOnReVault._withdrawConfigurableVault()`: `isKilled` is checked before processing any withdrawal. This blocks fee, proceeds, liquidity, and buffer-reserve transfers to their configured destinations. - `LibOnReOffer._previewExecution()`: This function routes previews through `_requireExecutableOfferConfig`, which reverts when killed. This freezes all quotes. - `LibOnReBuffer.setBufferGrossApr()` and `LibOnReBuffer.setBufferFeeConfig()`: Buffer configuration changes can still result in a mint. Both functions settle accrued returns through `_accrue()` and a potential downstream call to `IManagedToken.mintBuffer()` without checking the killswitch. - `ManagedToken.mintBuffer()`: Direct token supply changes remain possible for authorized minters / burners.
Open the reportThe `swap_v2` implementation allows any `remaining_accounts_info` passed in the data to be included as supplementary tick arrays on top of the three default tick arrays provided. Requiring that the swap is executed within the three default tick arrays may mean some swaps that can be executed correctly may unexpectedly fail. The likelihood of this increases if the liquidity across ticks is shallow or if the size of the desired swap is large.
Open the reportWhen requesting a redemption within the protocol, a `RedemptionRequest` account is created on behalf of the user to track all state tied to their outstanding request. Once this request is either cancelled (by the user or by an admin) or fulfilled by the redemption admin, the `RedemptionRequest` account is no longer used but does not get closed. This means that every redemption request has a non-refundable rent overhead that users must pay even though their storage requirements are only temporary.
Open the reportThe approval verification logic reconstructs a signed approval message from the Ed25519 instruction (`signed_msg`) and separately accepts an `ApprovalMessage` argument (`msg`). While both messages are individually validated for `program_id`, `user_pubkey`, and `expiry_unix`, the implementation does not enforce that the signed message content exactly matches the message passed into the instruction. As a result, the cryptographic signature is not strictly bound to the instruction level message argument, relying instead on implicit assumptions about message construction. Since all fields are checked this additional check acts as a defence in depth.
Open the reportThe `calculate_fees()` function currently uses floor division when computing `token_fee_amount`. While the difference per transaction is small, repeated calls can cumulatively reduce the protocol’s collected fees.
Open the reportThe `verify_approval_message_generic()` function verifies an Ed25519 signature by extracting the previous instruction via its index and checking that the program ID matches the `ed25519_program`. However, the Ed25519 program is stateless, meaning the instruction should not include any accounts.
Open the reportThe `CreateRedemptionRequest` instruction includes an `expires_at` parameter that is validated against the current on chain timestamp to ensure the request has not expired. However, this expiration check is redundant because Solana transactions already include built-in replay protection via recent blockhashes. In this flow, both the `redeemer` and the `redemption_admin` sign the same transaction containing a recent blockhash. Solana only accepts transactions referencing blockhashes from the last ~150 blocks, which inherently limits how long a signed transaction can be executed. As a result, the explicit `expires_at` parameter does not provide additional security guarantees for redemption request creation.
Open the reportIn multiple places, accounts are held directly on the stack (e.g., `Account<'info, T>`). However, large or numerous account structs combined with deeper call stacks can exceed per-frame limits and cause runtime access violations, leading to transaction reverts. Practically, this manifests as stack overflow errors, producing instruction failures and degraded UX/temporary denial of service for affected flows. This directly affects reliability and user experience.
Open the reportThe `instructions::initialize::initialize()` function does not display an error if `state.boss` is already set. Not returning an error makes it harder to detect if the state was already initialized.
Open the reportThe `instructions::take_offer::calculate_buy_amount()` function does not return an error if the calculated buy token amount is zero because of integer truncation (rounding). Not checking the return value may lead to unexpected behavior.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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