Reserve security record
As of 20 Oct 2026, Reserve has 4 audit reports by 4 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Oak Security, dated 12 Mar 2026. Those reports list no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Audits4
Newest first
| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reserve Updates audit | Security firm: Oak Security | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · GitHub |
| Reserve security review | Security firm: Pashov Audit Group | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · GitHub |
| Reserve | Security firm: Ackee Blockchain Security | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · GitHub |
| RToken Ethereum Contracts | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Files named in the report | No open critical findings | Open · certificate.quantstamp.com |
Findings22
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| Low | 4 | 7 | 5 |
HighInteger Overflow / UnderflowRToken Ethereum Contracts · Quantstamp · 31 Oct 2019Fixed
Integer overflow/underflow occur when an integer hits its bit-size limit. Every integer has a set range; when that range is passed, the value loops back around. A clock is a good analogy: at 11:59, the minute hand goes to 0, not 60, because 59 is the largest possible minute. The following lines of code are potentially affected by integer overflow / underflow: * `L540: savingAssetOrignalAmount += sOriginalCreated;` * `L617: totalProportions += uint256(proportions[i]);` * `L621: (uint256(proportions[i]) * uint256(PROPORTION_BASE)) /` * `L667: if (rGross > (account.lDebt + account.rInterest)) {` * `L668: return rGross - account.lDebt - account.rInterest;` * `L705: (rAmount * hat.proportions[i]) / PROPORTION_BASE;` * `L717: (sInternalAmount * hat.proportions[i]) / PROPORTION_BASE;` * `L801: (rAmount * hat.proportions[i]) / PROPORTION_BASE;` * `L814: (sInternalAmount * hat.proportions[i]) / PROPORTION_BASE;`
Open the reportMediumFiller state manipulation causes denial-of-service across Folio operationsReserve security review · Pashov Audit Group · 11 Jun 2025Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportMediumDowncasting overflowReserve · Ackee Blockchain Security · 7 Oct 2022Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportMediumInsufficient data validationReserve · Ackee Blockchain Security · 7 Oct 2022Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportMediumPossible Transfer to 0x0 / Contract AddressRToken Ethereum Contracts · Quantstamp · 31 Oct 2019Fixed
It is rarely desirable for tokens to be sent to the `0x0` address (intentional token burning is a notable exception) nor to the contract itself. However, these mistakes are often made due to human errors. Hence, it's often a good idea to prevent these mistakes from happening within the smart contract itself. Neither `createHat` nor `createHatInternal` checks if one of the `recipients` addresses are equal to `0x0`. This allows a user to set one of the recipients to `0x0` by mistake, which would effectively lead to transferring tokens to `0x0` when `distributeLoans` is called.
Open the reportLowgetBid() returns incorrect results for past or future timestampsReserve security review · Pashov Audit Group · 11 Jun 2025Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowValidation in isValidSignature() prevents partial fills at good pricesReserve security review · Pashov Audit Group · 11 Jun 2025Fixed
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportLowPossible Confusion between `savingAssetConversionRate` and `10**18`RToken Ethereum Contracts · Quantstamp · 31 Oct 2019Fixed
On several lines of code (`L342`, `L386`, `L770`), the constant `10**18` is used for certain computations. For example: ``` 340: totalSavingsAmount += savingAssetOrignalAmount 341: .mul(ias.exchangeRateStored()) 342: .div(10**18); ``` Similar computations are being done on other lines of code using `savingAssetConversionRate`instead of the constant `10**18`. For example: ``` 368: stats.totalSavings = statsStored.totalInternalSavings 369: .mul(ias.exchangeRateStored()) 370: .div(savingAssetConversionRate); ``` Since the initial value used to initialize `savingAssetConversionRate` is `10**18`, it is unclear whether the constant `10**18` is being misused or not. A similar finding was observed for the same constant `10**18`and the call to `ias.exchangeRateStored()` (see `L770` versus `L750`).
Open the reportLowUnchecked Return ValueRToken Ethereum Contracts · Quantstamp · 31 Oct 2019Fixed
Most functions will return a `true` or `false` value upon success. Some functions, like `send()`, are more crucial to check than others. It's important to ensure that every necessary function is checked. The following unchecked return values were identified: * `RToken.changeAllocationStrategy(IAllocationStrategy)` ignores return value by external calls `token.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this),totalSupply)` * `RToken.changeAllocationStrategy(IAllocationStrategy)` ignores return value by external calls `token.approve(address(ias),totalSupply)` * `RToken.mintInternal(uint256)` ignores return value by external calls `token.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this),mintAmount)` * `RToken.mintInternal(uint256)` ignores return value by external calls `token.approve(address(ias),mintAmount)` * `RToken.redeemInternal(address,uint256)` ignores return value by external calls `token.transfer(redeemTo,redeemAmount)` * `RToken.estimateAndRecollectLoans(address,uint256)` ignores return value by external calls `ias.accrueInterest()` * `RToken.sameHatTransfer(address,address,uint256)` ignores return value by external calls `ias.accrueInterest()` * `RToken.payInterestInternal(address)` ignores return value by external calls `ias.accrueInterest()`
Open the reportLowUse of Experimental Features in ProductionRToken Ethereum Contracts · Quantstamp · 31 Oct 2019Fixed
Some smart contracts rely on the experimental feature `ABIEncoderV2`, whose use is discouraged in production. Some bugs associated with it have already been reported (see [https://blog.ethereum.org/2019/03/26/solidity-optimizer-and-abiencoderv2-bug/ and https://blog.ethereum.org/2019/06/25/solidity-storage-array-bugs/](https://blog.ethereum.org/2019/03/26/solidity-optimizer-and-abiencoderv2-bug/ and https://blog.ethereum.org/2019/06/25/solidity-storage-array-bugs/)), but have been fixed on release `0.5.10` onwards.
Open the reportContracts
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