RubyDex has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 3 Jul 2023; no critical findings reported.
Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firms’ own
8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 5 low (3 open, 5 acknowledged).
Centralization Related Risks
Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗
Centralized Control of Contract Upgrade
Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗
Dangerous External Call
Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗
Divide Before Multiply
Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗
lack of balance check on `outToken`
Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗
Missing Zero Address Validation
Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗
Out of Scope Dependency - Operator
Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗
Suggest using Openzeppelin's proxy patterns
Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rubydex - Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | Findings: 3 high · 11 low 6 fixed · 5 acknowledged · 3 open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 5 | 6 |
In the contract `UpdateState` the role `admin` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the implementation contract.  In the contract `UpdateStateImplementation` the role `admin` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set operators.  In the contract `UpdateStateImplementation` the role `operator` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `operator` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/update/delist symbols or update users' balances and positions.  In the contract `UpdateStateImplementation` the role `vault` has authority over the following functions: - `updateBalance()` - `updatePosition()` - `resetFreezeStart()` Any compromise to the `vault` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the variable `isFreezeStart` and update users' balances and positions. In the contract `Admin` the role `admin` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer the admin role.  In the contract `Vault` the role `admin` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the implementation contract.  In the contract `VaultImplementation` the role `admin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove signers, set operators, pause/unpause contract, and set the minimal number of signers needed for withdrawals.  In the contract `VaultImplementation` the role `operator` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `operator` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove assets and execute withdrawals.  In the contract `VaultImplementation` the role `update` has authority over the following function: - `transferOut()` Any compromise to the `update` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer tokens out.
Open the reportThe `UpdateState` and `Vault` contracts are upgradeable via their respective proxy contracts, which allows the owner to update the contract's implementation without the community's commitment. However, if an attacker gains access to the owner's account, they can modify the contract's implementation and drain tokens from the contract without the community's knowledge or consent.
Open the reportThe `VaultImplementation` contract contains the `swapAndDeposit()` and `tryExecuteWithdraw()` functions that can trigger the `swap()` function in the `MegaSwapper` contract. The `swap()` function performs an external call to the user-input address `caller`, which can potentially be a contract with unknown and potentially malicious code. This vulnerability could be exploited by attackers to carry out various types of attacks.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for RubyDex, dated 3 Jul 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“Rubydex - Audit”).
CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for RubyDex.
8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 5 low (3 open, 5 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.
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