RubyDex audit reports

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RubyDex has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 3 Jul 2023; no critical findings reported.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm8

Statuses are the security firms’ own

8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 5 low (3 open, 5 acknowledged).

High
3
Low
5
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Centralized Control of Contract Upgrade

    Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Dangerous External Call

    Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Acknowledged

    Divide Before Multiply

    Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Acknowledged

    lack of balance check on `outToken`

    Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Acknowledged

    Missing Zero Address Validation

    Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Acknowledged

    Out of Scope Dependency - Operator

    Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

  • Low Acknowledged

    Suggest using Openzeppelin's proxy patterns

    Rubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
Rubydex - AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 3 high · 11 low
6 fixed · 5 acknowledged · 3 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings14

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High300
Medium000
Low056
HighCentralization Related RisksRubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023Open

In the contract `UpdateState` the role `admin` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the implementation contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/c1d8577711bf4ddfb55973805268abb9/diagrams/centralization_UpdateState-UpdateState-admin.svg) In the contract `UpdateStateImplementation` the role `admin` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set operators. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/c1d8577711bf4ddfb55973805268abb9/diagrams/centralization_UpdateStateImplementation-UpdateStateImplementation-admin.svg) In the contract `UpdateStateImplementation` the role `operator` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `operator` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/update/delist symbols or update users' balances and positions. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/c1d8577711bf4ddfb55973805268abb9/diagrams/centralization_UpdateStateImplementation-UpdateStateImplementation-isOperator.svg) In the contract `UpdateStateImplementation` the role `vault` has authority over the following functions: - `updateBalance()` - `updatePosition()` - `resetFreezeStart()` Any compromise to the `vault` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the variable `isFreezeStart` and update users' balances and positions. In the contract `Admin` the role `admin` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer the admin role. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/c1d8577711bf4ddfb55973805268abb9/diagrams/centralization_Admin-Admin-admin.svg) In the contract `Vault` the role `admin` has authority over the function shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the implementation contract. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/c1d8577711bf4ddfb55973805268abb9/diagrams/centralization_Vault-Vault-admin.svg) In the contract `VaultImplementation` the role `admin` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove signers, set operators, pause/unpause contract, and set the minimal number of signers needed for withdrawals. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/c1d8577711bf4ddfb55973805268abb9/diagrams/centralization_VaultImplementation-VaultImplementation-admin.svg) In the contract `VaultImplementation` the role `operator` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. Any compromise to the `operator` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and add/remove assets and execute withdrawals. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/c1d8577711bf4ddfb55973805268abb9/diagrams/centralization_VaultImplementation-VaultImplementation-isOperator.svg) In the contract `VaultImplementation` the role `update` has authority over the following function: - `transferOut()` Any compromise to the `update` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and transfer tokens out.

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HighCentralized Control of Contract UpgradeRubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023Open

The `UpdateState` and `Vault` contracts are upgradeable via their respective proxy contracts, which allows the owner to update the contract's implementation without the community's commitment. However, if an attacker gains access to the owner's account, they can modify the contract's implementation and drain tokens from the contract without the community's knowledge or consent.

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HighDangerous External CallRubydex - Audit · CertiK · 3 Jul 2023Open

The `VaultImplementation` contract contains the `swapAndDeposit()` and `tryExecuteWithdraw()` functions that can trigger the `swap()` function in the `MegaSwapper` contract. The `swap()` function performs an external call to the user-input address `caller`, which can potentially be a contract with unknown and potentially malicious code. This vulnerability could be exploited by attackers to carry out various types of attacks.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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The repositories and files the reports name

RubyDex: questions

Is RubyDex audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for RubyDex, dated 3 Jul 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“Rubydex - Audit”).

Who audited RubyDex?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for RubyDex.

Are there open findings in RubyDex’s audits?

8 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 3 high, 5 low (3 open, 5 acknowledged). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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