Tribal Island audit reports

Tribal Island has 1 public audit report from CertiK; dated 15 Jun 2023; no critical findings reported.

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Last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Open findings across every firm2

Statuses are the security firms’ own

2 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high (all open).

High
2
  • High Open

    Centralization Related Risks

    TribalIsland · CertiK · 15 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

  • High Open

    Initial Token Distribution

    TribalIsland · CertiK · 15 Jun 2023 · Report ↗

Audits1

Newest first

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsFindingsSource
TribalIslandSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openFindings: 2 high · 2 low
2 fixed · 2 open
skynet.certik.com ↗

Findings4

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High200
Medium000
Low002
HighCentralization Related RisksTribalIsland · CertiK · 15 Jun 2023Open

In the contract `TICToken` the role `DEPLOYER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6cd44394bb224aaf8018caa6a7d0fb4a/diagrams/centralization_TICToken-TICToken-DEPLOYER_ROLE.svg) - `setMinters(address[] memory minters)`: Assigns the MINTER_ROLE to the specified list of addresses, can only be called by a user with the DEPLOYER_ROLE or MULTSIG_ROLE. - `revokeAdmin(address addr)`: Revokes the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE from the specified address, can only be called by a user with the DEPLOYER_ROLE or MULTSIG_ROLE. Any compromise to the `DEPLOYER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the project. --- In the contract `TICToken` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6cd44394bb224aaf8018caa6a7d0fb4a/diagrams/centralization_TICToken-TICToken-MINTER_ROLE.svg) - `rewards(address account, uint256 amount)`: Mints new tokens and adds them to the specified account's balance, can only be called by a user with the MINTER_ROLE. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the project. --- In the contract `TICToken` the role `MULTSIG_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6cd44394bb224aaf8018caa6a7d0fb4a/diagrams/centralization_TICToken-TICToken-MULTSIG_ROLE.svg) - `setMinters(address[] memory minters)`: Assigns the MINTER_ROLE to the specified list of addresses, can only be called by a user with the DEPLOYER_ROLE or MULTSIG_ROLE. - `setMultSig(address _multSigAddress)`: Sets a new address with the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, which is responsible for managing the MULTSIG_ROLE, can only be called by a user with the MULTSIG_ROLE. - `revokeAdmin(address addr)`: Revokes the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE from the specified address, can only be called by a user with the DEPLOYER_ROLE or MULTSIG_ROLE. Any compromise to the `MULTSIG_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the project. --- In the contract `TIToken` the role `DEPLOYER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6cd44394bb224aaf8018caa6a7d0fb4a/diagrams/centralization_TIToken-TIToken-DEPLOYER_ROLE.svg) - `setNftSaleAddress(address _nftSaleAddress)`: Set the NFT sale contract address, only callable by addresses with the `DEPLOYER_ROLE` or `MULTSIG_ROLE`. - `setMinters(address[] memory minters)`: Set multiple minter addresses, only callable by addresses with the `DEPLOYER_ROLE` or `MULTSIG_ROLE`. - `setOracleAddress(address _oracleAddress)`: Set the oracle contract address, only callable by addresses with the `DEPLOYER_ROLE` or `MULTSIG_ROLE`. Any compromise to the `DEPLOYER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the project. --- In the contract `TIToken` the role `MINTER_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6cd44394bb224aaf8018caa6a7d0fb4a/diagrams/centralization_TIToken-TIToken-MINTER_ROLE.svg) - `rewards(address account, uint256 amount)`: Mint new tokens as rewards for an account, only callable by addresses with the `MINTER_ROLE`. Any compromise to the `MINTER_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the project. --- In the contract `TIToken` the role `MULTSIG_ROLE` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below. ![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.acc.corp.certik.com/6cd44394bb224aaf8018caa6a7d0fb4a/diagrams/centralization_TIToken-TIToken-MULTSIG_ROLE.svg) - `setNftSaleAddress(address _nftSaleAddress)`: Set the NFT sale contract address, only callable by addresses with the `DEPLOYER_ROLE` or `MULTSIG_ROLE`. - `setMinters(address[] memory minters)`: Set multiple minter addresses, only callable by addresses with the `DEPLOYER_ROLE` or `MULTSIG_ROLE`. - `setOracleAddress(address _oracleAddress)`: Set the oracle contract address, only callable by addresses with the `DEPLOYER_ROLE` or `MULTSIG_ROLE`. - `revokeAdmin(address addr)`: Revoke the `DEPLOYER_ROLE` from an address, only callable by addresses with the `MULTSIG_ROLE`. Any compromise to the `MULTSIG_ROLE` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and update the sensitive settings and execute sensitive functions of the project. --- In the contract `TIToken` the role `nftSaleAddress` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram

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HighInitial Token DistributionTribalIsland · CertiK · 15 Jun 2023Open

All `TIC` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute `TIC` tokens without the consensus of the community.

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Contracts

No deployed address is recorded for these audits.

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The repositories and files the reports name

Tribal Island: questions

Is Tribal Island audited?

Trustblock holds 1 public audit report for Tribal Island, dated 15 Jun 2023. The latest is by CertiK (“TribalIsland”).

Who audited Tribal Island?

CertiK wrote the report Trustblock holds for Tribal Island.

Are there open findings in Tribal Island’s audits?

2 findings are still open or acknowledged in the firms’ reports: 2 high (all open). No critical finding is reported. Statuses are the security firms’ own.

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