As of 19 Nov 2026, Velvet Capital has 3 audit reports by 2 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Resonance Security, dated 19 Sep 2024. Those reports list no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Velvet Capital | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | 1 critical finding, fixed | IPFS ↗ |
| Velvet Capital - V3 Smart Contracts | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | 1 critical finding, fixed | GitHub ↗ |
| Velvet audit | Security firm: PeckShield | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | 1 critical finding, fixed | GitHub ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Medium | 0 | 2 | 7 |
| Low | 0 | 6 | 5 |
Marked Info by the firms. Not counted as findings.
The ERC165 standard defines a supportsInterface function which is designed to verify that a particular address has a contract deployed that implements expected functionalities. Using ERC165 checks is considered a good practice as it eliminates most of the user errors related to providing invalid addresses. Furthermore, the supportsInterface check also indirectly assures that no zero-address was provided.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe function transferSuperAdminOwnership() is used to transfer the SUPER_ADMIN role from one account to another. When successful, the account of the address identified by the variable _newAccount will be the new SUPER_ADMIN, and the variable _oldAccount will identify the account that was stripped of this role. However, it should be noted that only the ownership of this role is transferred, which means that, previous roles that may have been assigned by the previous SUPER_ADMIN to themselves or others will stay in place.In cases the SUPER_ADMIN role is being transferred due to a compromise of the respective account, this issue becomes more relevant and impactful as the malicious actor may assign important roles on the protocol that will serve as a backdoor for future use.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe Velvet Capital contracts are often using arrays as parameters for their functions. Those arrays are usually looped over to execute certain actions. However, it was observed that in some cases, there checks to make sure that the arrays necessary for a given execution flow have matching lengths. As a result, it is possible to provide arrays with different lengths that will make the execution fail when EVM will try to access an element that does not exist in an array.The missing checks were identified for contracts:EnsoHandlerBundled - missing check on tokensLength and callDataEnso.length in multiTokenSwapAndTransfer function.Rebalancing - missing check on sellAmounts.length and sellTokens.length in _updateWeights function.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe FeeManagement contract is responsible for holding values for various fees associated with using the protocol. It also implements a functionality to change values of those fees. The update mechanism is a 2-step process that uses a time period until the second step, actual fee change, can be executed. Using such a time period is considered a good practice. However, it was observed that after one successful update, the same update function can be called indefinitely, until new fee proposal is created. Such subsequent update calls wouldn't change the fee, however they would still emit an event which might disrupt operation of any entity that uses this data.This finding is related to the updateManagementFee, updatePerformanceFee and updateEntryAndExitFee functions.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe PriceOracle contract responsible for fetching prices from Chainlink's oracles implements some checks to make sure that the price returned by the Chainlink oracle is valid. One of those checks is to ensure that it is not equal to 0. However, Chainlink oracles contain variety of information, not necessarily the price of an asset with regards to another asset. This is why, the answer returned by Chainlink's oracle is of type int256. Although it is very unlikely for an asset price oracle to return a negative price, the check if it is equal to 0 would not catch this case.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe PriceOracle contract implements a latestRoundData function responsible for returning the most recent price. This function executes various checks, making sure that the price is accurate, i.e. that it is not equal to zero and that it is not expired. It was observed that the expire check is done twice - via a require statement and then as a manual if statement. Having two checks that verify the same thing is redundant. If the check would cause the execution to fail, only one statement will suffice to cause this. On the other hand, if the price is not expired, then the contract will effectively execute the same check twice, making it less gas efficient.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe function multiTokenWithdrawal() indirectly performs the same validations of the user's portfolio tokens for withdrawal twice. The first time occurs within _beforeWithdrawCheck() and the second occurs right after on _validateUserWithdrawal(). On both instances, if failing, the checks revert the transaction with the same error CallerNotHavingGivenPortfolioTokenAmount().
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe function updateTokens() indirectly performs the same validations provided by beforeInitCheck() twice on the same variable _newTokens. The first time occurs within _updateTokensCheck() where every token is verified in a loop and performs a call to beforeInitCheck(). The second time occurs right after on updateTokenList() that does the exact same validations in a for loop.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe following functions and modifiers were found to be unused within the system:_lastSnapshotId()notPaused()Unused functions increase the complexity and readability of the smart contract's code and their inclusion should be discouraged whenever possible.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe following variables were found to be unused within the system:_protocolConfig in setUpRoles()Unused variables increase the complexity and readability of the smart contract's code and their inclusion should be discouraged whenever possible.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
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