Venus Protocol security record

BNB Chain, Ethereumvenus.ioX

As of 19 Nov 2026, Venus Protocol has 67 audit reports by 7 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Quantstamp, dated 13 Sep 2025. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 2 deployed contracts on 2 chains and 2 incidents (latest 12 May 2022).

Critical findings
No open critical findings
Across the 67 reports, 4 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it. See the findings
Incident
Incident 12 May 2022
Source: De.Fi incident database. 63 audits have been published since. See the incidents
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Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.

Audits67

Newest first

67 audit reports, 40 in CertiK’s series, 11 in Quantstamp’s series

ReportSecurity firmDateScopeCritical findingsSource
Venus - Vaults AuditSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openskynet.certik.com ↗
Venus - Liquidator ContractSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openskynet.certik.com ↗
Venus / Lending PlatformSecurity firm: HackenDate: Scope: Files listedNone openhacken.io ↗
Venus / DEXSecurity firm: HackenDate: Scope: Files listed1 critical finding, fixedhacken.io ↗
Venus Protocol SwapRouter AuditSecurity firm: OpenZeppelinDate: Scope: Files listedNone openblog.openzeppelin.com ↗
Venus - Isolated PoolsSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listed1 critical finding, fixedskynet.certik.com ↗
Venus Protocol Oracles AuditSecurity firm: OpenZeppelinDate: Scope: Files listedNone openblog.openzeppelin.com ↗
Venus - VAI PegSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listed1 critical finding, fixedskynet.certik.com ↗
Venus - Swap RouterSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listed1 critical finding, fixedskynet.certik.com ↗
Venus - OracleSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openskynet.certik.com ↗
Venus protocol (vaults)Security firm: QuantstampDate: Scope: Repository at commit f1426f0None opencertificate.quantstamp.com ↗
Venus / OracleSecurity firm: HackenDate: Scope: Files listedNone openhacken.io ↗
Venus / Lending PlatformSecurity firm: HackenDate: Scope: Files listedNone openhacken.io ↗
Venus: Venus MintBehalf auditSecurity firm: PeckShieldDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
Venus: Venus Grant auditSecurity firm: PeckShieldDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
Venus auditSecurity firm: PeckShieldDate: Scope: Not recorded; see the reportNone openGitHub ↗
Swipe Venus ProtocolSecurity firm: CertiKDate: Scope: Files listedNone openskynet.certik.com ↗

Findings428

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixedMitigated
Critical0030
High160130
Medium54320
Low51392039

The firm marks these findings Mitigated. They are not counted as open, acknowledged or fixed.

LowConsiderations on Claiming Rewards for Other Users for the VAI and XVS VaultsVenus protocol (vaults) · Quantstamp · 19 May 2023Mitigated

The XVS Vault allows anyone to `claim()` a user's interest in any pool. Typically, this is not an issue when the pool has enough rewards to be claimed. However, the XVS vault is limited in its ability to distribute rewards by the number of rewards available in `XVSStore`. If there are not enough rewards at the time the staker claims, they will get fewer rewards than they should. If the rewards are insufficient, stakers would rather wait until they become enough to claim. However, anyone can claim them and force them to lose some part of their rewards. A similar issue exists when claiming the XVS rewards in the VAI vault.

Open the report
LowInaccurate Calculation of Stake Amount for XVS Vault PoolsVenus protocol (vaults) · Quantstamp · 19 May 2023Mitigated

According to the code comments, the `getStakeAmount()` function ``` @notice Get the XVS stake balance of an account (excluding the pending withdrawals) ``` However, the returned stake amount only accounts for the pool whose pool and rewards tokens are both XVS. In other words, deposits in pools whose pool token is XVS but the rewards token is not XVS are not considered valid XVS stake balance.

Open the report
LowMissing Input ValidationVenus protocol (vaults) · Quantstamp · 19 May 2023Mitigated

It is important to validate inputs, even if they only come from trusted addresses, to avoid human error. The following functions do not have a proper validation of input parameters: 1. `XVSVault.add()` does not check: 1. that parameters `_rewardToken` and `_token` are different from `address(0)`. 1. that parameters `_rewardPerBlock` and `_lockPeriod` are non-zero. 1. `XVSVault.setXvsStore()` does not check: 1. that parameters `_xvs` and `_xvsStore` are different from `address(0)`. 1. `XVSStore.setPendingAdmin()` does not check: 1. that parameter `_admin` is different from `address(0)`. 1. that parameter `_admin` is different from the previous admin address. 1. `XVSStore.setNewOwner()` does not check: 1. that parameter `_owner` is different from the previous owner address.

Open the report
LowVaults May Not Deliver Full PayoutsVenus protocol (vaults) · Quantstamp · 19 May 2023Mitigated

The function `VAIVault.safeXVSTransfer()` transfers whatever XVS it can given the contract's balance, but `VAIVault._withdraw()` and `VAIVault.deposit()` both update the `user.rewardDebt` as if the full payout was delivered. `XVSStore.safeRewardTransfer()` and its usages exhibit the same behavior.

Open the report
LowBlock Time Is Subject to ChangeMitigated

The interest rate contracts store an immutable variable `blocksPerYear` to help with calculations. However, the block time for each chain is not guaranteed to remain the same across L2's. For opBNB, the currently configured block time is 1 second, according to the [official document](https://docs.bnbchain.org/opbnb-docs/docs/core-concepts/difference-L2), which, however, includes a warning that it is susceptible to changes.

LowBlock Time on Polygon zkEVM Depends on Chain UsageMitigated

The protocol's interest rate models calculate the borrow and supply rates per block of the markets based on their current utilization rate. The `blocksPerYear` immutable variable in the models is configured based on the deployed chain to adjust the market APR. On Ethereum, BSC, and opBNB chains, the block time can be considered a reliable source of timing information. However, for Polygon zkEVM, the block time is irregular at the time of writing and depends on the chain usage. According to the [historical average block time](https://zkevm.polygonscan.com/chart/blocktime) on the Polygon zkEVM explorer, we can observe that the average block time varies over time and is relatively unreliable. This is because, currently, Polygon zkEVM blocks are produced on-demand, according to [rollup.codes](https://www.rollup.codes/polygon-zkevm), > New L2 blocks contain only one L2 transaction and is created on-demand, i.e., once there is a new transaction. An irregular block time may also affect the reward distribution rate of the XVS vault, which calculates the reward amount based on a configured `rewardTokenAmountsPerBlock` value and the number of passed blocks.

LowMissing Input ValidationMitigated

It is important to validate inputs, even if they only come from trusted addresses, to avoid human error. The following functions are missing validation checks: 1. `ProtocolShareReserve` 1. `initialize()` 1. `_accessControlManager` should not be `address(0)`. 2. `_loopsLimit` should not be `0`. 2. `addOrUpdateDistributionConfigs()` 1. `configs` should have a length greater than `0`. 3. `releaseFunds()` 1. `assets` should have a length greater than `0`. 2. `Isolated Pool VToken` 1. `setReduceReservesBlockDelta()` 1. `_newReduceReservesBlockDelta` should be greater than `0`. Otherwise, this would lead to an inconsistent reduction of reserves. 2. `mint()` 1. Allows to mint based on 0 underlying tokens 3. `Core Pool VToken` 1. `setReduceReservesBlockDelta()` 1. `_newReduceReservesBlockDelta` should be greater than `0`.

LowOracle Assumes a Fixed 1:1 Ratio Between stETH and ETHMitigated

The `WstETHOracle` contract returns the price of the `wstETH` token in USD, which is calculated as follows: <p style="text-align: center;">$$P_{WSTETH/USD} = P_{WSTETH/STETH} \times P_{WETH/USD}$$</p> where $$P_{WSTETH/STETH}$$ represents the amount of `stETH` equivalent to 1 `wstETH` token, and $$P_{WETH/USD}$$ represents the price of `WETH` in USD. The former is fetched from the on-chain `stETH` token contract and reflects the actual exchange rate between `wstETH` and `stETH` in the Lido protocol when querying the price. The latter is fetched and returned from the `ResilientOracle`. This pricing formula assumes a 1:1 ratio between `stETH` and `ETH`, i.e., `stETH` is pegged to `ETH`. Such a design raises the following security concerns: 1. The oracle is unable to reflect the market price of `stETH`. Suppose `stETH` depegs from `ETH`, which may be due to reasons such as a large amount of `ETH` being removed from the Curve `stETH/ETH` pool. The market price of `stETH` has dropped, while the protocol may overvalue `stETH` temporarily during the depeg event. Assuming the depeg does not recover in time (note that withdrawals from Lido are not confirmed instantly compared to deposits), positions with `wstETH` as collateral will have an advantage in terms of borrowing power during this period. 1. Suppose the depeg continues so that the spread between the exchange rate and the market price is larger than $$1 - LT$$ (where $$LT$$ represents the liquidation threshold). In that case, it will become profitable to deposit `stETH` as collateral to the protocol, borrow `ETH`, and sell it in the secondary market. The utilization rate of `ETH` may increase, leading to potential issues such as lacking liquidity for withdrawals. 1. In an extreme scenario where the depeg cannot be recovered, the protocol may accrue bad debts if underwater positions with `wstETH` as collateral cannot be liquidated in time.

LowPotential DoS Issue in `ProtocolShareReserve`'s `addOrUpdateDistributionConfigs()`Mitigated

The `ProtocolShareReserve.addOrUpdateDistributionConfigs()` function allows privileged roles to add or update the distribution configurations. Before these configurations are updated, the `_accrueAndReleaseFundsToPrime()` function is invoked to signal `Prime` to accrue interests. Then, `ProtocolShareReserve` transfers funds to `Prime` by invoking the `_releaseFund()` internal function with every asset in the `Prime` contract's market as an argument. According to the code comments, the accrual and release of funds to `Prime` are necessary before updating the distribution configurations. However, this design introduces a potential issue where failing to accrue and release funds to `Prime` will block the configuration updates. Additionally, during the `_releaseFund()` function call, two external calls occur: 1. Tokens are transferred from `ProtocolShareReserve` to each configured destination. 2. The `updateAssetsState()` function is called on each destination contract. If any of the external calls fails, the entire transaction fails. Failures can occur due to various reasons, including but not limited to: 1. A bug in the `Prime` contract causing the interest accrual call to fail. 2. A bug on the destination contracts causing the `updateAssetsState()` call to fail. 3. Token transfer failures to the destination contracts, which can occur due to token pausing, reverting on zero-value transfers, blacklisting of the sender or receiver, etc. In cases 1 or 2, the `Prime` or destination contracts may require fixes and/or upgrades to unblock the `addOrUpdateDistributionConfigs()` call. In case 3, a potential solution could be the `Prime` contract removing the problematic tokens from its market. However, regardless of the specific issue, the problematic configuration can block the updates of others until the issue is resolved.

Incidents2

Attached through a shared contract address. Our incident data ends in Nov 2026.

Incident

Incident,

5M.

Source: De.Fi incident database.

Audits before it
4.
Audits since
63, the latest dated 13 Sep 2025.
Incident

Incident,

Source: De.Fi incident database.

Audits before it
1.
Audits since
66, the latest dated 13 Sep 2025.

Contracts2

AddressChainSource code
0xd3cc9d8f3689b83c91b7b59cab4946b063eb894aChain: EthereumSource code: Verified source
0x67c549a18abfad127b13f8d56738f43a21bb62a7Chain: BNB ChainSource code: Verified source

All 2 addresses and the files the reports name

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