Incident,
5M.
Source: De.Fi incident database.
- Audits before it
- 4.
- Audits since
- 63, the latest dated 13 Sep 2025.
As of 19 Nov 2026, Venus Protocol has 67 audit reports by 7 security firms on Trustblock; the latest is by Quantstamp, dated 13 Sep 2025. Those reports list no open critical findings. It also holds 2 deployed contracts on 2 chains and 2 incidents (latest 12 May 2022).
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
67 audit reports, 40 in CertiK’s series, 11 in Quantstamp’s series
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Venus - Vaults Audit | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| Venus - Liquidator Contract | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| Venus / Lending Platform | Security firm: Hacken | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | hacken.io ↗ |
| Venus / DEX | Security firm: Hacken | Date: | Scope: Files listed | 1 critical finding, fixed | hacken.io ↗ |
| Venus Protocol SwapRouter Audit | Security firm: OpenZeppelin | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | blog.openzeppelin.com ↗ |
| Venus - Isolated Pools | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | 1 critical finding, fixed | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| Venus Protocol Oracles Audit | Security firm: OpenZeppelin | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | blog.openzeppelin.com ↗ |
| Venus - VAI Peg | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | 1 critical finding, fixed | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| Venus - Swap Router | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | 1 critical finding, fixed | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| Venus - Oracle | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
| Venus protocol (vaults) | Security firm: Quantstamp | Date: | Scope: Repository at commit f1426f0 | None open | certificate.quantstamp.com ↗ |
| Venus / Oracle | Security firm: Hacken | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | hacken.io ↗ |
| Venus / Lending Platform | Security firm: Hacken | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | hacken.io ↗ |
| Venus: Venus MintBehalf audit | Security firm: PeckShield | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | GitHub ↗ |
| Venus: Venus Grant audit | Security firm: PeckShield | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | GitHub ↗ |
| Venus audit | Security firm: PeckShield | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | GitHub ↗ |
| Swipe Venus Protocol | Security firm: CertiK | Date: | Scope: Files listed | None open | skynet.certik.com ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed | Mitigated |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| High | 16 | 0 | 13 | 0 |
| Medium | 5 | 4 | 32 | 0 |
| Low | 51 | 39 | 203 | 9 |
The firm marks these findings Mitigated. They are not counted as open, acknowledged or fixed.
The XVS Vault allows anyone to `claim()` a user's interest in any pool. Typically, this is not an issue when the pool has enough rewards to be claimed. However, the XVS vault is limited in its ability to distribute rewards by the number of rewards available in `XVSStore`. If there are not enough rewards at the time the staker claims, they will get fewer rewards than they should. If the rewards are insufficient, stakers would rather wait until they become enough to claim. However, anyone can claim them and force them to lose some part of their rewards. A similar issue exists when claiming the XVS rewards in the VAI vault.
Open the reportAccording to the code comments, the `getStakeAmount()` function ``` @notice Get the XVS stake balance of an account (excluding the pending withdrawals) ``` However, the returned stake amount only accounts for the pool whose pool and rewards tokens are both XVS. In other words, deposits in pools whose pool token is XVS but the rewards token is not XVS are not considered valid XVS stake balance.
Open the reportIt is important to validate inputs, even if they only come from trusted addresses, to avoid human error. The following functions do not have a proper validation of input parameters: 1. `XVSVault.add()` does not check: 1. that parameters `_rewardToken` and `_token` are different from `address(0)`. 1. that parameters `_rewardPerBlock` and `_lockPeriod` are non-zero. 1. `XVSVault.setXvsStore()` does not check: 1. that parameters `_xvs` and `_xvsStore` are different from `address(0)`. 1. `XVSStore.setPendingAdmin()` does not check: 1. that parameter `_admin` is different from `address(0)`. 1. that parameter `_admin` is different from the previous admin address. 1. `XVSStore.setNewOwner()` does not check: 1. that parameter `_owner` is different from the previous owner address.
Open the reportThe function `VAIVault.safeXVSTransfer()` transfers whatever XVS it can given the contract's balance, but `VAIVault._withdraw()` and `VAIVault.deposit()` both update the `user.rewardDebt` as if the full payout was delivered. `XVSStore.safeRewardTransfer()` and its usages exhibit the same behavior.
Open the reportThe interest rate contracts store an immutable variable `blocksPerYear` to help with calculations. However, the block time for each chain is not guaranteed to remain the same across L2's. For opBNB, the currently configured block time is 1 second, according to the [official document](https://docs.bnbchain.org/opbnb-docs/docs/core-concepts/difference-L2), which, however, includes a warning that it is susceptible to changes.
The protocol's interest rate models calculate the borrow and supply rates per block of the markets based on their current utilization rate. The `blocksPerYear` immutable variable in the models is configured based on the deployed chain to adjust the market APR. On Ethereum, BSC, and opBNB chains, the block time can be considered a reliable source of timing information. However, for Polygon zkEVM, the block time is irregular at the time of writing and depends on the chain usage. According to the [historical average block time](https://zkevm.polygonscan.com/chart/blocktime) on the Polygon zkEVM explorer, we can observe that the average block time varies over time and is relatively unreliable. This is because, currently, Polygon zkEVM blocks are produced on-demand, according to [rollup.codes](https://www.rollup.codes/polygon-zkevm), > New L2 blocks contain only one L2 transaction and is created on-demand, i.e., once there is a new transaction. An irregular block time may also affect the reward distribution rate of the XVS vault, which calculates the reward amount based on a configured `rewardTokenAmountsPerBlock` value and the number of passed blocks.
It is important to validate inputs, even if they only come from trusted addresses, to avoid human error. The following functions are missing validation checks: 1. `ProtocolShareReserve` 1. `initialize()` 1. `_accessControlManager` should not be `address(0)`. 2. `_loopsLimit` should not be `0`. 2. `addOrUpdateDistributionConfigs()` 1. `configs` should have a length greater than `0`. 3. `releaseFunds()` 1. `assets` should have a length greater than `0`. 2. `Isolated Pool VToken` 1. `setReduceReservesBlockDelta()` 1. `_newReduceReservesBlockDelta` should be greater than `0`. Otherwise, this would lead to an inconsistent reduction of reserves. 2. `mint()` 1. Allows to mint based on 0 underlying tokens 3. `Core Pool VToken` 1. `setReduceReservesBlockDelta()` 1. `_newReduceReservesBlockDelta` should be greater than `0`.
The `WstETHOracle` contract returns the price of the `wstETH` token in USD, which is calculated as follows: <p style="text-align: center;">$$P_{WSTETH/USD} = P_{WSTETH/STETH} \times P_{WETH/USD}$$</p> where $$P_{WSTETH/STETH}$$ represents the amount of `stETH` equivalent to 1 `wstETH` token, and $$P_{WETH/USD}$$ represents the price of `WETH` in USD. The former is fetched from the on-chain `stETH` token contract and reflects the actual exchange rate between `wstETH` and `stETH` in the Lido protocol when querying the price. The latter is fetched and returned from the `ResilientOracle`. This pricing formula assumes a 1:1 ratio between `stETH` and `ETH`, i.e., `stETH` is pegged to `ETH`. Such a design raises the following security concerns: 1. The oracle is unable to reflect the market price of `stETH`. Suppose `stETH` depegs from `ETH`, which may be due to reasons such as a large amount of `ETH` being removed from the Curve `stETH/ETH` pool. The market price of `stETH` has dropped, while the protocol may overvalue `stETH` temporarily during the depeg event. Assuming the depeg does not recover in time (note that withdrawals from Lido are not confirmed instantly compared to deposits), positions with `wstETH` as collateral will have an advantage in terms of borrowing power during this period. 1. Suppose the depeg continues so that the spread between the exchange rate and the market price is larger than $$1 - LT$$ (where $$LT$$ represents the liquidation threshold). In that case, it will become profitable to deposit `stETH` as collateral to the protocol, borrow `ETH`, and sell it in the secondary market. The utilization rate of `ETH` may increase, leading to potential issues such as lacking liquidity for withdrawals. 1. In an extreme scenario where the depeg cannot be recovered, the protocol may accrue bad debts if underwater positions with `wstETH` as collateral cannot be liquidated in time.
The `ProtocolShareReserve.addOrUpdateDistributionConfigs()` function allows privileged roles to add or update the distribution configurations. Before these configurations are updated, the `_accrueAndReleaseFundsToPrime()` function is invoked to signal `Prime` to accrue interests. Then, `ProtocolShareReserve` transfers funds to `Prime` by invoking the `_releaseFund()` internal function with every asset in the `Prime` contract's market as an argument. According to the code comments, the accrual and release of funds to `Prime` are necessary before updating the distribution configurations. However, this design introduces a potential issue where failing to accrue and release funds to `Prime` will block the configuration updates. Additionally, during the `_releaseFund()` function call, two external calls occur: 1. Tokens are transferred from `ProtocolShareReserve` to each configured destination. 2. The `updateAssetsState()` function is called on each destination contract. If any of the external calls fails, the entire transaction fails. Failures can occur due to various reasons, including but not limited to: 1. A bug in the `Prime` contract causing the interest accrual call to fail. 2. A bug on the destination contracts causing the `updateAssetsState()` call to fail. 3. Token transfer failures to the destination contracts, which can occur due to token pausing, reverting on zero-value transfers, blacklisting of the sender or receiver, etc. In cases 1 or 2, the `Prime` or destination contracts may require fixes and/or upgrades to unblock the `addOrUpdateDistributionConfigs()` call. In case 3, a potential solution could be the `Prime` contract removing the problematic tokens from its market. However, regardless of the specific issue, the problematic configuration can block the updates of others until the issue is resolved.
Attached through a shared contract address. Our incident data ends in Nov 2026.
5M.
Source: De.Fi incident database.
Source: De.Fi incident database.
| Address | Chain | Source code |
|---|---|---|
| 0xd3cc…894a0xd3cc9d8f3689b83c91b7b59cab4946b063eb894a | Chain: Ethereum | Source code: Verified source |
| 0x67c5…62a70x67c549a18abfad127b13f8d56738f43a21bb62a7 | Chain: BNB Chain | Source code: Verified source |
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