Saffron

QuantstampFiles named in the report

Quantstamp reviewed saffron.finance (Saffron) on 13 Jan 2023: 5 findings, 0 critical; 2 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
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Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings12

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium000
Low032

Marked Informational or Undetermined by the firm. Not counted as findings.

InformationalDuplicated EventsAcknowledged

Setter functions can emit duplicated events that may confuse external systems when the new value is equal to the old value: 1. `VaultFactory.setDefaultDepositTolerance()` 2. `VaultFactory.setFeeReceiver()` 3. `VaultFactory.setFeeBps()`

UndeterminedOne Fixed Side Depositor Can Front-Run Another Fixed Side Depositor Given a Lucrative VaultAcknowledged

When a vault is created, if the fixed side reward is of high value, another user can front-run the vault creator and become the fixed side depositor, hence stealing opportunity from the vault creator. This will create a race condition where users will try to take a lucrative vault, even if the vault creator intended it for himself.

InformationalClone-and-OwnFixed

The clone-and-own approach involves copying and adjusting open source code at one's own discretion. From the development perspective, it is initially beneficial as it reduces the amount of effort. However, from the security perspective, it involves some risks as the code may not follow the best practices, may contain a security vulnerability, or may include intentionally or unintentionally modified upstream libraries. Use Uniswap's `FullMath.sol` instead of `Math.sol` to avoid maintaining the code.

InformationalMissing RequirementsFixed

`UniV3LimitedRangeAdapter.removeLiquidity()` should require that earning have been settled. Safety checks must be implemented at the smart contract level to prevent future breaking changes. Similarly, `UniV3LimitedRangeAdapter.deployCapital()` should require that the token ID is not set in order to safely execute the transaction..

InformationalOutdated Solidity VersionFixed

As security standards develop, so does the Solidity language. To stay up to date with current practices, it's important to use a recent version of Solidity and recent conventions.

InformationalUnclear Variable NamingFixed

Local variable naming in `UniV3LimitedRangeAdapter.mintToken()` is confusing: ``` (..., uint256 minted0, uint256 minted1) = positionManager.mint(params); ``` `minted0` and `minted1` do not represent minted amounts but the amount used as liquidity for the Uniswap pool.

InformationalUnlocked PragmaFixed

Every Solidity file specifies in the header a version number of the format `pragma solidity (^)0.8.*`. The caret (`^`) before the version number implies an unlocked pragma, meaning that the compiler will use the specified version _and above_, hence the term "unlocked".

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (22)

  • contracts/interfaces/IAdapter.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-core/contracts/libraries/Tick.sol
  • contracts/RestrictedVaultFactory_checked.sol
  • contracts/Vault.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/interfaces/INonfungibleTokenPositionDescriptor.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-core/contracts/libraries/TickMath.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/interfaces/INonfungiblePositionManager.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/LiquidityAmounts.sol
  • contracts/adapters/AdapterBase.sol
  • contracts/adapters/UniV3LimitedRangeAdapter.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/PoolAddress.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/IVault.sol
  • contracts/UniV3Vault.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-core/contracts/libraries/SafeCast.sol
  • contracts/VaultFactory.sol
  • contracts/Math_checked.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/FullMath.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/PositionKey.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/PositionValue.sol
  • contracts/VaultBearerToken_checked.sol
  • contracts/adapters/UniV3FullRangeAdapter.sol
  • contracts/vendor/@uniswap/v3-periphery/contracts/libraries/ChainId.sol

Part of saffron.finance’s security record

saffron.finance
Audits8 audits by 5 firmsLast audit Mar 2026, by Pashov Audit Group.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 8 reports, 3 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
Open saffron.finance’s security record

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Quantstamp

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