Part of Quantstamp’s series
Quantstamp reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus Income Allocation) on 12 Oct 2023: 12 findings, 0 critical; 2 marked fixed, 10 acknowledged; 2 more marked mitigated.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed | Mitigated |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 8 | 2 | 2 |
Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.
For the core pool, access to the `vToken._reduceReserves()` function is controlled by the `AccessControlManager`, which checks whether the caller is authorized to invoke this function. However, in the case of `vBNB`, the `vBNBAdmin.reduceReserves()` function operates without access control. This means that anyone can call the `reduceReserves()` function, which triggers the `vBNBAdmin` contract to call `vBNB._reduceReserves()`. This inconsistency between `vBNB` and the other core pool vTokens could potentially lead to different behaviors in their operations.
These contracts are using solidity version `0.8.13`. While no high-severity issues are present in that version, it is currently recommended to use version `0.8.18`.
The `VBNBAdmin` contract implements a `fallback()` function that is only callable by the admin, and this function forwards the call to the `vBNB` contract. This design allows the admin to call any function on the `vBNB` contract as needed. However, if the call to the `vBNB` contract results in a BNB transfer back to the `VBNBAdmin` contract, no mechanism is currently in place to retrieve the received BNB specifically. These BNB will be considered token reserves and forwarded to the `ProtocolShareReserve` contract when the `reduceReserves()` is called.
In the `ProtocolShareReserve._releaseFund()` function, funds are first transferred to destinations, followed by the call of the `updateAssetsState()` function on the destination contracts. Then, the `assetsReserves` and `totalAssetReserve` state variables are updated. Note that since the state changes are applied after the external calls, the read of the contract state during the external call will be inaccurate. It is important to note that the state changes are applied after the external calls. This means that during the external call of the `_releaseFund()` function if any destination contract (or a contract subsequently called by the destination contract during `updateAssetsState()`) reads the `assetsReserves` or `totalAssetReserve` state variables or invokes the `getUnreleasedFunds()` function, it will receive inaccurate values. These inaccuracies can potentially lead to accounting issues within the calling contracts.
The `accrueInterest()` function in the Core Pool `VToken` contract uses a library to perform arithmetic calculations due to the older Solidity version. The new implementation of this function, which adds the ability to call `_reduceReservesFresh()` if enough blocks have passed since it was last called, performs a calculation without using the library. While this should not be an issue, as the block number is steadily increasing, it is recommended to match previous standards.
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