Part of Quantstamp’s series
Quantstamp reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus - Mutichain Governance) on 10 May 2024: 4 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 3 | 1 |
When a proposal is received from the layer zero endpoint, it is queued with the relevant timelock based on the proposal type. Timelock contracts can be updated via `addTimelocks()`, but there is no check that enforces them to be unique. Hence, the contract can use the same timelock for all 3 proposal types. This could lead to issues where `proposalTimelocks[proposalType_].queuedTransactions` transactions will revert if the same transaction has been sent with multiple proposal types, for example, to get it expedited.
The `addTimelocks()` function allows the admin to update the timelock contracts. However, it does not check if the timelocks to be updated have queued transactions, which could lead to an inconsistent state where transactions can never be executed. The usage of Timelock functions such as `cancelTransaction()` and `executeTransaction()` rely on the fact that the underlying timelock has not changed; if that is the case, the old queued transactions would need to be resent as a new proposal since the old ones could neither be canceled nor executed. However, this could make the whole process questionable for users since proposals can be silently canceled or skipped.
When a proposal is sent via the `execute()` method in the `OmnnichainProposalSender` contract, the `_validateProposal()` function increments the command count within a 24-hour window. If the proposal dispatch fails, this increment is not reverted, potentially obstructing future proposals in the same window. Moreover, retrying the execution could erroneously increase the command count twice if `_validateProposal()` is called again within the same period, further risking the execution of subsequent proposals.
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Repository and files the report names (7)
240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026
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