Venus - Mutichain Governance

QuantstampRepository at commit 266ae02

Audit

Part of Quantstamp’s series

Quantstamp reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus - Mutichain Governance) on 10 May 2024: 4 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Venus Protocol’s security record

Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium000
Low031
Low`timelocks_` Entries Should Be UniqueAcknowledged

When a proposal is received from the layer zero endpoint, it is queued with the relevant timelock based on the proposal type. Timelock contracts can be updated via `addTimelocks()`, but there is no check that enforces them to be unique. Hence, the contract can use the same timelock for all 3 proposal types. This could lead to issues where `proposalTimelocks[proposalType_].queuedTransactions` transactions will revert if the same transaction has been sent with multiple proposal types, for example, to get it expedited.

LowPossibility to Skip Proposals By Changing TimelockAcknowledged

The `addTimelocks()` function allows the admin to update the timelock contracts. However, it does not check if the timelocks to be updated have queued transactions, which could lead to an inconsistent state where transactions can never be executed. The usage of Timelock functions such as `cancelTransaction()` and `executeTransaction()` rely on the fact that the underlying timelock has not changed; if that is the case, the old queued transactions would need to be resent as a new proposal since the old ones could neither be canceled nor executed. However, this could make the whole process questionable for users since proposals can be silently canceled or skipped.

LowThe Internal State of `BaseOmnichainControllerSrc` Is Not Reverted After an Execution FailureAcknowledged

When a proposal is sent via the `execute()` method in the `OmnnichainProposalSender` contract, the `_validateProposal()` function increments the command count within a 24-hour window. If the proposal dispatch fails, this increment is not reverted, potentially obstructing future proposals in the same window. Moreover, retrying the execution could erroneously increase the command count twice if `_validateProposal()` is called again within the same period, further risking the execution of subsequent proposals.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (7)

  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/BaseOmnichainControllerDest.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/OmnichainGovernanceExecutor.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/BaseOmnichainControllerSrc.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/interfaces/ITimelock.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Governance/TimelockV8.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/OmnichainProposalSender.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/OmnichainExecutorOwner.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613

Part of Venus Protocol’s security record

Venus Protocol
Audits67 audits by 7 firmsLast audit Sep 2025, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 67 reports, 4 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
IncidentIncident 12 May 2022Source: De.Fi incident database.
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