Venus - Mutichain Governance

QuantstampRepository at commit 266ae02

Audit

Part of Quantstamp’s series

Quantstamp reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus - Mutichain Governance) on 10 May 2024: 4 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Venus Protocol’s security record

Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

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Findings9

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium000
Low031

Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.

InformationalCritical Governance Proposal Can Be Blocked by Daily Command LimitsAcknowledged

The `OmnichainProposalSender` and `OmnichainGovernanceExecutor` include mechanisms to limit the number of commands that can be sent and received within 24 hours. These daily limits may prevent critical proposals from being executed promptly if the limit is reached, potentially delaying important governance actions.

InformationalCritical Role Transfer Not Following Two-Step PatternAcknowledged

The owner of the contract can call `transferOwnership()` to transfer the ownership to a new address. If an uncontrollable address is accidentally provided as the new owner address then the contract will no longer have an active owner, and functions with the `onlyOwner` modifier can no longer be executed.

InformationalProposal Execution Order Not Guaranteed in Venus Multichain GovernanceAcknowledged

The execution order of proposals is not guaranteed in the Venus multichain governance. Due to the non-blocking nature of the message receiver, proposals sent across chains may not be executed in the order they were intended. This lack of a guaranteed execution order can be particularly problematic for interdependent or sequence-sensitive proposals. Although the scenario presented below is unlikely, it demonstrates the potential impact of out-of-order proposal execution. Additionally, this misordering can be compounded by potential race conditions such as: 1. Calling `setSrcChainId()` will invalidate any proposals that are yet to be received from that chain or any proposals in the `failedMessages` mapping. 2. If `execute()` and `cancel()` are called at a similar time, the behavior of the proposal will be based on the ordering of the transactions in the block.

InformationalMissing `_zroPaymentAddress` SpecificationFixed

The `send()` function in `OmnichainProposalSender` is used to send proposal data to the LayerZero endpoint and includes the `_zroPaymentAddress` parameter. This parameter is required when the executor chooses to pay transaction fees using ZRO tokens instead of native currency. The address provided must meet the following conditions: `require(_zroPaymentAddress == ua || _zroPaymentAddress == tx.origin, "LayerZero: must be paid by sender or origin");` This requirement ensures that the transaction fees are paid either by the user application (ua, typically `OmnichainProposalSender`) or the transaction's origin (`tx.origin`).

InformationalPossibility of Accepting Messages From Compromised RemotesFixed

The `OmnichainGovernanceExecutor` contract is set up as a non-blocking app, which allows for the replaying of unsuccessful messages via `retryMessage()` which makes a subsequent call to `_nonblockingLzReceive()` that attempts to retry the failed message. This can be an issue if a trusted remote address is compromised and is removed as a trusted remote since neither of the above mentioned functions perform any validation checks on whether the address behind a `_srcChainId` is still a `trustedRemote`.

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (7)

  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/BaseOmnichainControllerDest.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/OmnichainGovernanceExecutor.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/BaseOmnichainControllerSrc.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/interfaces/ITimelock.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Governance/TimelockV8.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/OmnichainProposalSender.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/governance-contracts/contracts/Cross-chain/OmnichainExecutorOwner.sol at commit 266ae02d3395e583a7520392a403931105cae613

Part of Venus Protocol’s security record

Venus Protocol
Audits67 audits by 7 firmsLast audit Sep 2025, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 67 reports, 4 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
IncidentIncident 12 May 2022Source: De.Fi incident database.
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