Part of Quantstamp’s series
Quantstamp reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus - Mutichain Governance) on 10 May 2024: 4 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 3 acknowledged.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 3 | 1 |
Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.
The `OmnichainProposalSender` and `OmnichainGovernanceExecutor` include mechanisms to limit the number of commands that can be sent and received within 24 hours. These daily limits may prevent critical proposals from being executed promptly if the limit is reached, potentially delaying important governance actions.
The owner of the contract can call `transferOwnership()` to transfer the ownership to a new address. If an uncontrollable address is accidentally provided as the new owner address then the contract will no longer have an active owner, and functions with the `onlyOwner` modifier can no longer be executed.
The execution order of proposals is not guaranteed in the Venus multichain governance. Due to the non-blocking nature of the message receiver, proposals sent across chains may not be executed in the order they were intended. This lack of a guaranteed execution order can be particularly problematic for interdependent or sequence-sensitive proposals. Although the scenario presented below is unlikely, it demonstrates the potential impact of out-of-order proposal execution. Additionally, this misordering can be compounded by potential race conditions such as: 1. Calling `setSrcChainId()` will invalidate any proposals that are yet to be received from that chain or any proposals in the `failedMessages` mapping. 2. If `execute()` and `cancel()` are called at a similar time, the behavior of the proposal will be based on the ordering of the transactions in the block.
The `send()` function in `OmnichainProposalSender` is used to send proposal data to the LayerZero endpoint and includes the `_zroPaymentAddress` parameter. This parameter is required when the executor chooses to pay transaction fees using ZRO tokens instead of native currency. The address provided must meet the following conditions: `require(_zroPaymentAddress == ua || _zroPaymentAddress == tx.origin, "LayerZero: must be paid by sender or origin");` This requirement ensures that the transaction fees are paid either by the user application (ua, typically `OmnichainProposalSender`) or the transaction's origin (`tx.origin`).
The `OmnichainGovernanceExecutor` contract is set up as a non-blocking app, which allows for the replaying of unsuccessful messages via `retryMessage()` which makes a subsequent call to `_nonblockingLzReceive()` that attempts to retry the failed message. This can be an issue if a trusted remote address is compromised and is removed as a trusted remote since neither of the above mentioned functions perform any validation checks on whether the address behind a `_srcChainId` is still a `trustedRemote`.
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240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026
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