Venus Liquidator

QuantstampRepository at commit 457c8cd

Audit

Part of Quantstamp’s series

Quantstamp reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus Liquidator) on 26 Jul 2023: 5 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged.

No open critical findings
Open the reportOpen Venus Protocol’s security record

Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.

Trustblock does not review code.

Findings7

Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.

SeverityOpenAcknowledgedFixed
Critical000
High000
Medium000
Low041
LowReserve Reduction Logic May Not Be ExecutedAcknowledged

The `_reduceReservesInternal()` function may not carry out its logic in a liquidation event in case `pendingRedeemChunkLength`remains unset (defaulted to zero). It does not matter how many items are in `pendingRedeem`, as long as `pendingRedeemChunkLength`remains unset, the `range` and, therefore, the ìndex` variables will be set to zero and the loop will be skipped.

LowThe Protocol Might Get More Collateral than DesiredAcknowledged

The `comptroller.liquidationIncentiveMantissa()` is used to determine the amount of collateral to be seized based on the amount of debt that the liquidator wants to pay, and to limit the maximum percentage value that the `treasuryPercentMantissa` can have. If the `liquidationIncentiveMantissa` gets reduced under the value of the `treasuryPercentMantissa` without updating the latter, it would lead to the protocol getting more collateral than what should be.

LowUninitialized `forceVAILiquidate` Allows Bypassing the `VAI` Debt ValidationAcknowledged

The `forceVAILiquidate` variable enforces the protocol to check the debt amount of `VAI` token. If it is greater than the minimum threshold (`minLiquidatableVAI`), then it should revert the liquidation procedure unless the liquidated token is the `VAI` token. Additionally, the documentation states that the protocol will enforce the liquidation of `VAI` first over other tokens. However, the `forceVAILiquidate` variable is not set during the initialization step and will default to a paused state, which would essentially bypass the need to validate the `VAI` debt.

LowUsing Vulnerable Solidity VersionAcknowledged

As security standards develop, so does the Solidity language. In order to stay up to date with current practices, it's important to use a recent version of Solidity and recent conventions. The version used in all the contracts in scope, `0.8.13`, is known to have vulnerabilities, for more information [see here](https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/blob/11be2f4881d1644f15b026d1022388f06a034a34/docs/bugs_by_version.json#L1738C9-L1738C9).

Contracts in scope

No deployed address is recorded for this audit.

The report names a repository or files. Open the report to see its scope.

Repository and files the report names (3)

  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/venus-protocol/contracts/Liquidator/LiquidatorStorage.sol at commit 457c8cd36c3a935b53d6fdca0ef8afab6dc39754
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/venus-protocol/contracts/Liquidator/Interfaces.sol at commit 457c8cd36c3a935b53d6fdca0ef8afab6dc39754
  • https://github.com/VenusProtocol/venus-protocol/contracts/Liquidator/Liquidator.sol at commit 457c8cd36c3a935b53d6fdca0ef8afab6dc39754

Part of Venus Protocol’s security record

Venus Protocol
Audits67 audits by 7 firmsLast audit Sep 2025, by Quantstamp.
Critical findingsNo open critical findingsAcross the 67 reports, 4 critical findings were reported. Each is marked fixed by the firm that reported it.
IncidentIncident 12 May 2022Source: De.Fi incident database.
Open Venus Protocol’s security record

Security firm

Quantstamp

240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026

See Quantstamp’s audits

Something wrong on this page? A missing report, a wrong date, a finding that was fixed since. Tell us and we check it against its source.

Tell us