Part of Quantstamp’s series
Quantstamp reviewed Venus Protocol (Venus Liquidator) on 26 Jul 2023: 5 findings, 0 critical; 1 marked fixed, 4 acknowledged.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Low | 0 | 4 | 1 |
Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.
The function `_checkForceVAILiquidate()` initiates by verifying whether the VAI liquidation is currently paused. If a pause is detected, it bypasses the subsequent checks and continues with the rest of the execution. However, when the `vToken` is identified as the `VAI` token, the `liquidateBorrow()` function neglects to confirm the pausing status of the `vaiController` prior to attempting the liquidation. This oversight may potentially cause a revert within the `vaiController` contract, as confirmed by the Venus team. However, the Liquidator contract has the capability to manage this situation before invoking the `vaiController` contract.
The Liquidator contract inherits `Ownable2StepUpgradeable`, which allows having an owner of the contract. It also features a function allowing to renounce owner role via `renounceOwnership()`. If the owner renounces their ownership, any function guarded by the `onlyOwner` modifier will no longer be able to be executed.
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Repository and files the report names (3)
240 projects reviewed · 338 reports · latest Nov 2026
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