Quantstamp reviewed Hinkal (Hinkal Protocol - 2) on 28 Aug 2026: 9 findings, 0 critical; 8 marked fixed, 1 acknowledged.
Report hosted on certificate.quantstamp.com.
Trustblock does not review code.
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from its report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Low | 0 | 1 | 7 |
Marked Informational by the firm. Not counted as findings.
`EmporiumUpgradeable.runAction()` executes the caller-supplied `stack.ops` as arbitrary calls from the Emporium contract. However, its balance checks only protect the caller-supplied `circomData.erc20TokenAddresses`. An attacker can submit a Min0 proof with no token rows and set `signerAddress` to `address(0)`, which requires no signature in `verifyWallet()`. The attacker can then use `stack.ops` to transfer residual ERC20 tokens or native ETH from Emporium. An empty token array prevents the resulting balance decrease from being checked. This allows anyone to steal assets accidentally transferred, donated, or stranded in Emporium. The attacker may also spend third-party assets through allowances previously granted by Emporium.
`0` as a hash could be problematic and short-cut Merkle tree paths.
In the circom template `ConditionalOverflowPreventer` the signal `enabled` is not constrained to be 0 or 1, despite the intention being that it represents a boolean true or false value. Since this value is later multiplied against a real value, it may change that value in problematic ways. The severity of this issue is lower as within the current architecture the template is only used within `OverflowPreventer.circom` where the value of `enabled` is always hardcoded to 1. It would be safer for future updates to ensure the input is constrained within the template itself rather than assuming it has already been validated outside of the template.
Privileged roles can replace various security-critical helper contracts without delay, potentially introducing unintended changes that apply for already in-flight transactions. 1. The `HINKAL_HELPER_MANAGER` role can replace `hinkalHelper` at will. That contract both assembles the public-input vector fed to the verifier and enforces the `calldataHash` integrity check that binds the proof to the spend data. 2. The `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` can call the `registerExternalAction()` function to replace external action addresses. 3. The `owner` can register any address as the Groth16 verifier for a proof shape using the `registerVerifiers()` function.
Improve input validation in the following locations: 1. Add a reverting 0-address check in `setHinkalHelper()`. 2. In `insertNullifiers()`, require that any slot flagged `onChainCreation` carries only zero-valued `inputNullifiers` instead of just skipping nullifier recording for `onChainCreation` slots. 3. Require `input.length == inputAmount` in the verifier wrapper.
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