As of 28 Oct 2026, RTLabs has 2 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by Resonance Security, dated 7 Feb 2025. Those reports list no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Oct 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
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| Audit | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RTLabs | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | No open critical findings | Open · IPFS |
| RTLabs | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: Not recorded (see the report) | 1 critical finding, fixed | Open · IPFS |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Low | 3 | 0 | 8 |
Throughout the source code there are multiple instances that lead to a dead end as unimplemented features and functionalities are never reached. These should be cleaned up to increase the quality of the code and decrease the bytecode stored on the blockchain.
Open the reportThe program specifies accounts that possess validations against constant public keys. These keys cannot be changed unless there is a redeployment of the program into the blockchain. In cases where the accounts related to these public keys become rogue or compromised, the program and users interacting with it may be at risk. This is especially problematic when Solana programs are removed of its update authority and become immutable.It should be noted that this finding was introduced due to the lack of a deployment script for the program, and as such, should be considered a recommendation for best practices.
Open the reportThe function _convertToShares() is used by addLiquidity() to calculate the total amount of shares supply on the protocol. The calculation of the supply is proportional to the value tracked by the variable totalPooledEther. Not only does this variable increase via addLiquidity(), but also via receive() and selfdestruct(). When any of the latter situation happens, the variable supply does not increase. For specially crafted transactions, it may be possible for a malicious user to deny the smart contract from servicing legitimate users.It should be noted that the impact of this vulnerability directly depends on the amount of Ether the malicious user is willing to spend to grief other users.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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