As of 19 Nov 2026, RTLabs has 4 audit reports by 1 security firm on Trustblock; the latest is by Resonance Security, dated 7 Feb 2025. Those reports list no open critical findings.
Record last updated . It holds audits and findings, contracts and incidents up to Nov 2026. Trustblock does not review code.
Newest first
| Report | Security firm | Date | Scope | Critical findings | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RTLabs - Demether Restaking Solana | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | GitHub ↗ |
| RTLabs | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | None open | IPFS ↗ |
| RTLabs - Demether Protocol | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | 1 critical finding, fixed | GitHub ↗ |
| RTLabs | Security firm: Resonance Security | Date: | Scope: —Not recorded; see the report | 1 critical finding, fixed | IPFS ↗ |
Statuses are the security firm’s own, from each report.
| Severity | Open | Acknowledged | Fixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| High | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Medium | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| Low | 0 | 2 | 10 |
Marked Info by the firms. Not counted as findings.
The report gives no description here.
Open the reportThroughout the source code there are multiple instances that lead to a dead end as unimplemented features and functionalities are never reached. These should be cleaned up to increase the quality of the code and decrease the bytecode stored on the blockchain.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe program specifies accounts that possess validations against constant public keys. These keys cannot be changed unless there is a redeployment of the program into the blockchain. In cases where the accounts related to these public keys become rogue or compromised, the program and users interacting with it may be at risk. This is especially problematic when Solana programs are removed of its update authority and become immutable.It should be noted that this finding was introduced due to the lack of a deployment script for the program, and as such, should be considered a recommendation for best practices.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportSmart contract upgradeability using OpenZeppelin's standard, requires contracts to use initializer functions. The function to use on child contract should be named initialize() and should possess the initializer modifier, while parent contracts should have _init() and _init_unchained() functions with the modifier onlyInitializing, where there would otherwise be constructors called automatically on non-upgradeable smart contracts.The initializer functions on the parent smart contracts are meant to be initialized by the child contract, as such, their visibility can be constrained to internal. The following functions do not implement the proper visibility to encourage a principle of least privilege:The visibility of the function __OwnableAccessControl_init() is incorrectly set as public.
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThe functions _init() and _init_unchained() are an implementation of OpenZeppelin's Upgradeable Proxies design standard and are used to serve as the constructor of upgradeable contracts. Despite being both used as initializers, they possess slightly different use cases to correctly implement the analog linearization of smart contract constructors.The function _init() should be used and implemented to embed the linearized calls to all parent initializers. The function _init_unchained() should be used to perform the initialization of the variables for the current contract only.As a consequence of this design, it is possible that, due to the lack of automatic linearization, the calling of _init() functions initializes the same contract multiple times. For these cases, the _init_unchained() function may be used manually to avoid double initialization, however it will break the upgradeability design and compatibility between smart contracts on the blockchain.Additionally, the inherited smart contracts should be initialized according to their inheritance order, from the most base-like to the most derived.There are multiple instances where contracts do not follow the design standard in the following account:_init_unchained() function is not used.Initialization according to inheritance order is incorrect
Open the reportThe report gives no description here.
Open the reportThroughout the source code of the protocol, there are several instances where uint256 variables are being compared to 0. The comparison of these variables being lesser than or equal to 0 is redundant as uint256 variables can only contain 0 or positive values.
Open the reportThe reports name a repository or files. Open a report to see its scope.
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